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LENDER LIABILITY TO DEBTORS:
TOWARD A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
by
Werner F. Ebke*and James R. Griffin**
To pull one misshapen stone out
of the grotesque structure is
more likely simply to upset its
present balance between adverse
interests than to establish a ra-
tional edifice.I
ECENT years have witnessed a rapid increase in problem loans. In
response, banks2 and other commercial lending institutions3 in the
United States have used a number of workout practices 4 to improve
or secure their position vis-A-vis their debtors. Such practices, however,
have come under increasing attack by debtors, shareholders, creditors, bank-
ruptcy trustees, and others. In the recent Texas case State National Bank v.
Farah Manufacturing Co. ,5 the plaintiff-debtor received a jury award of ap-
proximately $19 million in compensatory damages against a group of finan-
cial institutions as a result of an alleged conspiratorial course of tortious
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* Referendar (J.D.), Doktor der Rechte (S.J.D.), University of Muenster School of Law;
LL.M., University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall). Assistant Professor of Law, South-
ern Methodist University School of Law.
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Jackson, Walker, Winstead, Cantwell & Miller, Dallas, Texas.
1. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948) (Jackson, J.).
2. A bank is commonly defined as an institution that takes deposits and makes commer-
cial loans. See, e.g., Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982). This
definition allows nonbanks to operate as long as they offer only one, not both, of these services.
The broad construction of the statute has permitted money market funds and nonbank giants,
such as American Express, Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc., and Sears Roebuck and
Co. to offer various financial services and to establish multistate banking units. For a general
discussion of the evolving definition of the term "bank" under the Bank Holding Company
Act see Felsenfeld, Nonbank Banks-An Issue in Need of a Policy, 41 Bus. LAW. 99, 108-11
(1985). As to the distinction between commercial banking and investment banking see Securi-
ties Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 104 S. Ct. 2979, 2984-86, 82 L. Ed. 2d 107, 114-16
(1984).
3. The term "commercial lending institutions" includes thrift institutions such as mutual
savings banks, savings and loan associations, and credit unions. See J. NORTON & S.
WHITLEY, BANKING LAW MANUAL § 1.0313] (1984).
4. For a general discussion of workouts see: Franklin, Pre-Bankruptcy Planning Issues
in Workout Situations, in 1 INST. ON FUNDAMENTALS OF COM. LENDING GG-I (Southern
Methodist University School of Law ed. 1985); Rosenberg, An Overview of Workouts from the
Perspective of the Institutional Lender, 16 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (1984).
5. 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, writ dism'd by agr.).
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conduct marked with fraud, duress, and interference with the debtor's cor-
porate governance process. 6 In another recent case a federal court awarded
$7.5 million for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
resulting from a lender's refusal to advance funds up to the credit limit
under a preexisting financing agreement. 7 Lenders may also be subject to
substantial punitive damages as a result of their conduct in relation to their
debtors.8 In one recent California case the court affirmed a $1 million jury
verdict against a lender who fraudulently represented that it would advance
additional funds to its debtor.9 In view of these recent decisions it is no
wonder that the developing theories of lender liability have inspired fear and
mystery in bankers, borrowers, and lawyers.
The theories of liability that have been asserted against commercial lend-
ers in the United States include both common law and statutory claims. The
common law claims usually are based upon tort principles such as fraud,
breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, duress, and interference. Statutory claims have been asserted
under the Uniform Commercial Code, '0 the Bankruptcy Code,11 the federal
securities laws,1 2 the tax and wage laws, 13 and the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 14
Rather than plunging into the technical and doctrinal details of the
emerging theories of liability that have been asserted against commercial
lenders in the United States, this Article analyzes the present and possible
future concepts of distribution of risks in commercial lending transactions.
The primary objective of this Article is to develop a model that can be imple-
mented to draw a balance between the competing interests of lenders and
debtors. The discussion first focuses upon the impact of common law theo-
ries on lender liability resulting from alleged misconduct. The Article then
focuses upon the legal, economical, and social expedience of the emerging
6. Id. at 667.
7. K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 766 (6th Cir. 1985).
8. On June 24, 1986, a lender liability suit was filed in the Federal District Court for the
Northern District of Texas. The suit, filed by members of the Hunt family, asks for $3.6
billion in damages including punitive damages. Dallas Morning News, Jun. 25, 1986, at IA,
col. 1. The complaint alleges that 23 lending institutions committed acts of fraud, racketeer-
ing, and breach of contract to force the repayment of $1.5 billion in outstanding loans. Id.
The complaint further alleges antitrust violations on the part of the institutions. Id.
This case is the first major lender liability case in Texas since Farah. Significantly, the com-
plaint is based on the emerging theories of lender liability rather than the traditional bases of
liability. As this Article will discuss, the emerging theories are easier to establish and more
conducive to large damage awards than other liability theories. This case will, no doubt,
demonstrate the extent to which Farah and other lender liability decisions have altered the
traditional balance between debtor and creditor interests.
9. Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of Am., 38 Cal. 3d 892, 910, 701 P.2d 826, 839, 215 Cal. Rptr.
679, 692 (1985).
10. For the text of the relevant provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code see infra note
42.
11. For the text of the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Code see infra note 43.
12. For the text of the relevant provisions of the federal securities laws see infra note 44.
13. For the text of the relevant provisions of the tax and wage laws see infra note 45.
14. For the text of the relevant provisions of RICO see infra note 46.
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theories of lender liability and discusses possible alternatives to contempo-
rary solutions.
I. THE FARAH CONTROVERSY: AN UNCOMMON EXPERIENCE
State National Bank v. Farah Manufacturing Co. 15 vividly illustrates the
legal and economic risks as well as the practical problems associated with a
lender's attempt to improve its position vis-a-vis the debtor. The case cen-
ters around a management change clause contained in a $22 million loan
agreement. In order to appreciate fully the significance of this case and the
holdings of the Texas Court of Appeals in El Paso, a close look at the facts
of the case and the events giving rise to the litigation is not only helpful, but
necessary.
A. Success, Failure, and Change
Farah Manufacturing Company (FMC) began operations in 1919 as a
family-owned apparel manufacturer. In 1976 FMC was a company besieged
with problems. The El Paso, Texas, corporation was burdened by low sales,
high production costs, excess plant capacity, and unsold inventory. The
company was recovering from a bitter, drawn-out labor strike that was ac-
companied by a nationwide boycott of its products.16 In addition to the
labor unrest, discontent existed throughout the executive offices of FMC
during that troubled period. A number of upper-management employees left
FMC. During the period from 1972 to July 1976 the company experienced a
pre-tax loss of more than $43 million, and shareholder's equity declined by
$24.9 million.
Since 1964 William F. Farah had served as chairman of the board of di-
rectors, chief executive officer, and president of FMC. Farah was a blunt,
self-confident man who relied upon his own instincts rather than upon so-
phisticated marketing and management techniques. Although FMC was a
publicly held company listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the Farah
family dominated and controlled the affairs of the company. Under Farah's
leadership, FMC grew from a small domestic apparel manufacturer into a
major international business enterprise.
The problems of the 1970s, however, threatened the existence of the com-
pany. In early 1976 the Board of Directors of FMC (the Board), a board
hand-selected by Farah, concluded that FMC had outgrown Farah's ability
and that new leadership was necessary. The Board elected William Leone to
the office of president and chief operating officer of FMC, and in July of
1976 Leone replaced Farah as chief executive officer. 17 Although Farah
15. 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, writ dism'd by agr.).
16. The strike began in 1972 and was not settled until 1974.
17. Farah criticized and undermined Leone's business plan from the beginning of Leone's
presidency. Noting Farah's persistent, unwarranted interference, the Board forced Farah to
resign as chief executive officer in July 1976. The Board expressed displeasure with Farah's
management style, which was characterized by insubordination to Board directives and inade-
quate disclosure to the Board.
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continued to serve as chairman of the Board, Leone possessed exclusive re-
sponsibility over the affairs of the company. As a director of FMC since
1973, Leone was familiar with the affairs and problems of the company. Le-
one implemented a conservative plan to streamline operations and reposition
the company as a smaller producer of basic products. He also began negoti-
ations for a working capital loan to replace funds lost during the strike and
through unprofitable operations. Neither the business plan nor the loan ne-
gotiations proved immediately successful. Several major banks announced
that they would not participate in a loan package to FMC. The company's
primary lender for over thirty years not only refused to participate in a
working capital loan, but also terminated its line of credit with the
company. '8
B. The Loan Agreement
Not until June 1976 did three banks, Continental Illinois National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago (Continental), Republic National Bank of
Dallas (Republic),' 9 and State National Bank of El Paso (State National),
agree to enter into an $18 million interim financing arrangement with the
company. The banks relied upon Leone's ability to stop losses and improve
sales as well as upon his proposal to terminate and dispose of unnecessary
operations. On October 18, 1976, the interim financing agreement was con-
verted into a permanent revolving line of credit. The permanent loan agree-
ment provided for an unsecured, four-year loan in the amount of $22
million. To minimize the risks inherent in a long-term loan to FMC the
lenders included a management change clause in the permanent loan agree-
ment. 20 The clause permitted the lenders to call the loan if the prospect of
repayment was jeopardized by the removal of Leone as chief executive officer
of FMC.
FMC continued to falter. By the end of 1976 the company had breached
four financial covenants in the loan agreement. 2 1 Citing continued confi-
dence in Leone, the lenders waived the default in each instance. After addi-
tional defaults of financial covenants in the loan agreement the banks, in
conjunction with the Prudential Insurance Company of America (Pruden-
tial),2 2 restructured the loan agreement. Under the new agreement, dated
February 14, 1977, the lenders obtained a first lien security interest in
FMC's equipment, real estate, and machinery. 23 The agreement also con-
tained relaxed financial covenants and a strengthened management change
18. Brief of Appellant at 22 (copy on file at offices of Southwestern Law Journal).
19. Now RepublicBank Dallas, N.A.
20. The lenders were aware of the risks associated with a long-term loan to FMC. In a
memorandum prepared in August 1976 the lenders expressed confidence in Leone's ability to
turn the company around. The memorandum, however, also noted that the banks would face
a serious workout situation if Leone failed. Brief of Appellee at 18-19 (copy on file at offices of
Southwestern Law Journal).
21. Brief of Appellant at 29.
22. Prudential was a creditor of FMC under a 1971 loan agreement.
23. FMC asserted that the value of the collateral was approximately $72 million, more
than three times the amount of the loan itself. FMC therefore argued that "[o]nce the loan
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clause that allowed the lenders to declare a default if any change in FMC's
executive management occurred that was contrary to the lenders' interests.24
C. The Battle for Control Begins
Despite the efforts of Leone, FMC sustained substantial additional losses.
Fearful that the company was destined for bankruptcy, Farah requested the
Board to dismiss Leone and elect him as chief executive officer. At its meet-
ing on March 7, 1977, the Board declined to consider the request. The
Board expressed concern that Farah's election might trigger a default in the
restructured loan agreement. The Board instructed Farah to present his
plan to a meeting of the lenders.25
At the meeting with the lenders on March 14, 1977, Farah described
FMC's problems, presented his management plan, and proposed a method
to pay off the loan. Farah's proposal included the liquidation of excess in-
ventory and the disposition of certain assets. Although State National ex-
pressed opposition to the proposal, the question of Farah's return was left
unresolved. The lenders did, however, advise Farah that a change in the
chief executive office of FMC could violate the management change clause.
On the following day John Bunten, a senior loan officer and vice president of
Republic, assigned the FMC loan to a Republic workout specialist.
On March 16, 1977, Farah and Bunten coincidentally boarded the same
flight from Dallas to New York. During the flight Bunten indicated that the
management change clause was mere boilerplate and that Farah should re-
turn to El Paso and resume control. Thereafter, Farah began careful plan-
ning and preparation for his return to management and for the future of
FMC.
On March 17, 1977, Leone tendered his resignation from the Board. He
felt that Farah's persistent demands to become chief executive officer had
caused irreparable harm to the company. At the Board meeting held on
March 18, 1977, Farah nominated three candidates to fill board vacancies.
The election of Farah's candidates would have assured his own election.
Only one candidate, Richard Azar, however, agreed to serve. 26 Following
Azar's election, William Conroy, an employee and director of FMC since
the late 1950s and also a State National director, announced his candidacy
was fully collateralized, repayment was assured and the lenders had no business objective to
protect with the management change clause." Brief of Appellee at 18.
24. The amended management change clause stated:
Any change in the office of President and Chief Executive Officer of Farah
[Manufacturing Company, Inc.] or any other change in the executive manage-
ment of Farah [Manufacturing Company, Inc.] which any two Banks shall con-
sider, for any reason whatsoever, to be adverse to the interests of the Banks [shall
be an event of default in the agreement.]
678 S.W.2d at 667 (emphasis added).
25. Several days before Farah's meeting with the lenders two FMC directors resigned.
Their stated reasons for resigning were a lack of confidence in Farah and the likelihood of
significant problems arising from his proposed return to management. Another FMC director
resigned two days later.
26. At that time, the Board of Directors was composed of William Farah, Jimmy Farah
(Farah's son), Richard Azar, Gordon Foster, and William Conroy.
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for chief executive officer in opposition to Farah. Because a quorum of the
Board was not available, the Board took no action toward the election of a
chief executive officer. Instead, the Board authorized director Gordon Fos-
ter to request the banks to state their position under the management change
clause.
D. The Lenders' Position
On March 21, 1977, the lenders met to consider their response under the
management change clause to Farah's candidacy. The representatives of
Continental and State National opposed Farah's return.27 The banks then
had two options: they could either waive the default and acquiesce in
Farah's election, or they could declare the default and almost certainly force
FMC into bankruptcy. 28 State National did not want the responsibility for
the bankruptcy of the largest private employer in El Paso, Texas, nor was
State National willing to accept Farah's return.
Since neither option under the management change clause was acceptable,
the lenders created a third option to prevent Farah's election. The lenders
advised the Board that the election of Farah as chief executive officer was
unacceptable and that the banks would not grant a waiver of default if Farah
was elected. 29 The lenders agreed, however, to consider a waiver if the
Board concluded that a change in the chief executive office, involving others
than Farah, would be in the best interests of FMC. Although the lenders
had not made a corporate decision to call the loan, 30 their statement could
have created the false impression that a condition of default would be en-
forced if Farah were elected. 31
On March 22, 1977, the Board reconvened to consider the lenders' re-
sponse. Director Gordon Foster warned the Board that the banks would
call the loan if Farah were elected. Farah, relying upon his conversation
with Bunten less than a week earlier, remained undeterred in his effort to
regain control of FMC. He nominated two new candidates to the Board
who would support his bid for control. No action was taken on the election
of either Farah or his candidates. After the meeting Foster informed the
lenders of Farah's plans and of Leone's pending resignation as chief execu-
tive officer.
Early on March 23, 1977, the lenders met to reevaluate their position.
27. The representative of Continental felt that "if Farah were elected he should be
strongly controlled and have life made miserable for him." 678 S.W.2d at 671.
28. Due to cross-default provisions in FMC's bond indentures, the company would face
an immediate cash demand of approximately $40 million. Brief of Appellee at 42. If FMC
became bankrupt the lenders would lose their secured position under the February 14, 1977,
agreement. See infra note 43. Presumably, the lenders' desire to avoid or delay the bank-
ruptcy of FMC affected their choice of tactics.
29. The text of the lenders' letter is reproduced in full in the FMC brief. Brief of Appellee
at 47-49.
30. Following the meeting of the lenders on March 21, 1977, Continental's representative
noted that "[tihere was no decision" to call the loan if Farah were elected chief executive
officer. 678 S.W.2d at 671.
31. Id. at 672.
[Vol. 40
LENDER LIABILITY
Unless the lenders acted expeditiously and decisively, Farah's election was
virtually certain. Director Richard Azar, who was largely unfamiliar with
the problems and affairs of FMC, was regarded as the swing vote on the
Board. Later the same day the lenders met with Azar to explain the implica-
tions of the management change clause. Azar informed Jim Donohoe, attor-
ney for Republic, that only Farah could turn FMC around. In response,
Donohoe stated that he would automatically bankrupt the company and
padlock the doors if Farah were elected president of the company. A further
verbal exchange with Donohoe convinced Azar that the lenders' threats
were real. Azar not only agreed to vote for Conroy, but also agreed to urge
Farah to abandon his candidacy.
Immediately prior to the Board meeting scheduled later the same day, Mr.
Donohoe pounded the table in front of Farah and reiterated that he would
bankrupt the company and padlock the doors if Farah did not withdraw his
candidacy for chief executive officer and resign as chairman of the Board.
Azar met with Farah and confirmed Donohoe's threats. Farah was shocked
and stunned. In a state of dismay he followed the lenders' dictates and nom-
inated Conroy as chief executive officer and Foster as chairman of the
Board. Conroy and Foster were unanimously elected, and the lenders
agreed not to deem Conroy's election an event of default. Although the
management change clause did not extend to the election of directors, the
Board, under pressure from the lenders, refused to consider the election of
the candidates for the Board nominated by Farah.
E. A Management Satisfactory to the Lenders
On April 4, 1977, Judson Williams, Ray Pulley, and Robert Jaynes were
nominated and elected to FMC's board of directors. 32 Williams was also a
member of the board of directors of State National. Pulley, a former em-
ployee of Republic, was initially responsible for Republic's participation in
the FMC loan. As a condition to accepting the nomination Pulley required
Republic to execute an indemnification agreement in his favor. Jaynes was
the only new director with no apparent conflict of interest.
Under Conroy's leadership FMC's financial condition continued to de-
cline. Upon the lenders' recommendation the Board retained the services of
Grisanti and Galef, a nationally renowned consulting firm and workout spe-
cialist. Initially, Andrew Galef's activities included only monitoring FMC's
operations; however, Galef undertook greater responsibilities as Conroy's in-
ability to turn FMC around became obvious. In July 1977 Conroy resigned
as chief executive officer, and the Board elected Galef to the position. 33
Under Galef's leadership expenses soared while revenues declined. Galef
was unable to turn FMC around due to his inexperience in the men's apparel
business. In order to make prepayments on the loan to FMC, Galef em-
32. Following the election of Williams and Jaynes, Jimmy Farah resigned as a director to
create a vacancy on the Board for Pulley.
33. On September 24, 1977, Conroy resigned from the Board.
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barked on a plan of gradual liquidation of FMC. Galef, like Conroy and
Leone, was unable to restore financial stability to FMC.
F. Farah's Return
In response to a Board resolution calling for Farah's resignation as a di-
rector, both Azar and Farah resigned from the Board. Shortly thereafter,
Farah began a proxy contest to regain control of FMC. 34 Farah felt that he
had to act quickly to prevent FMC's bankruptcy. The lenders' threats to
bankrupt the company no longer intimidated Farah. As the trustee of a
voting trust created by his brother, Farah controlled approximately forty-six
percent of FMC voting stock. 35 Litigation supported by the lenders to re-
move Farah as trustee proved unsuccessful, and Farah's success in the proxy
fight was assured.
Farah regained control of FMC in April of 1978. Since then, FMC has
grown and prospered. Farah reestablished FMC as an able competitor in
the men's apparel market; he transformed losses into profits and near-bank-
ruptcy into prosperity. Despite the coordinated opposition of the lenders, he
succeeded where others had failed in turning around FMC. Under Farah's
leadership FMC refinanced the loan and ultimately repaid the loan in full. 36
In 1981 FMC filed suit against the lenders for damages incurred during
the period from April 1977 through March 1978. At the end of a lengthy
trial the jury returned a verdict in favor of FMC. The jury found that dur-
ing the period in question the lenders committed acts of fraud, duress, and
interference that proximately resulted in $18,947,348.77 of damages to the
company. 37 The components of the damages award were as follows:
$2,668.000.00 in actual losses during the period from April 1977 through
March 1978; $15,482,500.00 in lost profits during the period in question;
$721,848.77 attributable to auction sale losses; and $75,000.00 in lost profits
from auction sales. On appeal the damage award was modified and af-
firmed. 38 Although the Texas Supreme Court granted a writ of error, the
case was subsequently dismissed by agreement of the parties.
II. THE COMMON LAW THEORIES OF LENDER LIABILITY
The decision of the appellate court in Farah rested on the unique applica-
tion of three well-established common law theories: fraud, duress, and inter-
ference. Prior to Farah no court in the United States had applied those
theories jointly in the context of a debtor-creditor relationship. The unique-
34. For a review of the legal and practical issues connected with proxy contests see: E.
ARANOW & H. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (2d ed. 1968);
Emerson & Latcham, Proxy Contests: A Study in Shareholder Sovereignty, 41 CALIF. L. REV.
393 (1953).
35. For a succinct review of the legal and practical issues connected with voting trusts see
H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES
528-34 (3d ed. 1983).
36. Brief of Appellee at 107.
37. 678 S.W.2d at 667.
38. The El Paso court of appeals granted a remittitur of $300,105.00. Id. at 699.
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ness of the Farah decision does not mean, however, that other common law
claims against lenders have not been made. Courts throughout the United
States have held lenders liable under various complex theories of control,39
and recently some state courts have held lenders liable for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.4° Additionally, one state
court has considered the applicability of the prima facie tort theory in a
lender liability case.41
Although this Article limits its presentation to the common law theories
of lender liability, possible statutory bases of liability also exist. Claims
against lenders may be asserted under the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC), 4 2 the Bankruptcy Code, 43 the federal securities laws,44 the tax and
39. See Bartlett & Lapatin, The Status of a Creditor as a "Controlling Person," 28 MER-
CER L. REV. 639 (1977). For a detailed discussion of control based liability see infra notes 94-
120 and accompanying text.
40. "Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).
See generally Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith,
94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 378-94 (1980) (discussing operational standard for good faith perform-
ance of contracts). Liability under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be
based upon statutory law as well as the common law. For a detailed discussion of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and cases relying upon the implied covenant, see infra
notes 121-42 and accompanying text.
41. See Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). For an
analysis of the prima facie tort doctrine see Forkosch, An Analysis of the "Prima Facie Tort"
Cause of Action, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 465 (1957). For a detailed discussion of the prima facie
tort doctrine see infra notes 143-51 and accompanying text.
42. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19), 1-203, 1-208, 2-309 (1977). Id. § 1-203 states that: "Every
contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or
enforcement." The UCC defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned." Id. § 1-201(19). Id. § 1-208 states:
A term providing that one party or his successor in interest may accelerate pay-
ment or performance or require collateral or additional collateral "at will" or
"when he deems himself insecure" or in words of similar import shall be con-
strued to mean that he shall have power to do so only if he in good faith believes
that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired. The burden of estab-
lishing lack of good faith is on the party against whom the power has been
exercised.
Although art. 2 of the UCC is applicable only to contracts for the sale of goods, id. § 2-102,
one court recently relied on id. § 2-309 in holding a lender liable for failure to notify its bor-
rower prior to a refusal to lend. K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759-60 (6th
Cir. 1985). For a detailed discussion of this case see infra notes 124-30 and accompanying
text. U.C.C. § 2-309(3) (1977) states: "Termination of a contract by one party except on the
happening of an agreed event requires that reasonable notification be received by the other
party and an agreement dispensing with notification is invalid if its operation would be
unconscionable."
43. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1982) provides that "under principles of equitable subordination,
[a court may] subordinate for purposes of distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or
part of another allowed claim." Under § 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, a creditor may also
be required to return property received in a preferential transfer. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982);
see Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 308 (1939) ("bankruptcy court has the power to sift the
circumstances surrounding any claim to see that injustice or unfairness is not done in adminis-
tration of the bankrupt estate").
44. A lender may be liable as a controlling person under Securities Act of 1933, § 15, 15
U.S.C. § 77o (1982), and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1982).
Section 15 of the 1933 Act provides in part:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or
who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding with one
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wage laws, 45 and RICO. 46 This Article leaves discussion of these sources of
lender liability to other authors.
The following section of the Article explores the specific facts and legal
theories that led to liability in Farah. In contrast to the Farah theories this
section also discusses the pervasive requirements of control under instru-
mentality and agency theories. Finally, this section introduces briefly the
theories of good faith and fair dealing and prima facie tort.
A. The Farah Theories
FMC based its claims against the lenders upon the theories of fraud, du-
ress, and interference. Although FMC argued each theory independently,
the court's opinion suggests that a great deal of similarity exists between
these common law tort claims. Indeed, the Restatement (Second) of Torts
or more other persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise,
controls any person liable under sections 77k or 771 of this title, shall also be
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person
to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling
person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of
the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to
exist.
15 U.S.C. § 77o (1982). Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act provides:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any
provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person
to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling
person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or
acts constituting the violation or cause of action.
Id. § 78t(a). For a discussion of a controlling person's liability under the 1933 and 1934 Acts
see T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 207-08, 284 (1985); L. Loss, FUNDA-
MENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 441-56 (1983). Although the federal securities laws
contain no statutory definition of control, the Securities and Exchange Commission has de-
fined control as "the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction
of the management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securi-
ties, by contract, or otherwise." 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1985).
45. A lender who finances the payroll of its debtor may be liable under the Internal Reve-
nue Code for failure to collect and remit wage withholding taxes. I.R.C. § 3505(a) (1982)
provides:
[I]f a lender . . . who is not an employer . . . pays wages directly to such an
employee or group of employees ... such lender ... shall be liable in his own
person and estate to the United States in a sum equal to the taxes (together with
interest) required to be deducted and withheld from such wages by such
employer.
A similar liability provision applies in situations in which the lender supplies money to the
debtor for wages to be paid by the debtor. Id. § 3505(b).
46. A lender may be liable for engaging in activities prohibited under the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982). Id. § 1962(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, di-
rectly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection
of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal ... to
use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of
such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation
of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce.
Section 1963 may subject a lender to criminal liability for RICO violations and § 1964 may
subject a lender to civil liability. Id. §§ 1963, 1964.
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suggests that fraud and duress may constitute acts of interference. 47
1. Fraud.
FMC's cause of action for fraud focused upon the lenders' "no waiver"
letter of March 22, 1977, to the Board. 48 The action further focused upon
the statements made by Republic's attorney Donohoe to Farah and other
members of FMC's Board on March 23, 1977, regarding the bankruptcy and
padlocking of FMC if Farah were elected as chief executive officer.
A well-established common law principle exists that a person who fraudu-
lently makes a misrepresentation of fact for the purpose of inducing another
person to act is liable for injuries caused to the relying person.49 In addition,
a representation capable of two interpretations, one known to be false and
the other known to be true, may also constitute a fraudulent statement.50
Stirling v. Chemical Bank 51 illustrates this tort doctrine as applied to bank-
ers' liability cases. In this case the plaintiffs alleged that they resigned their
positions as officers and directors of the debtor company in reliance upon the
lenders' false representations that they would make further loans and not
call outstanding loans of the company. The court held that fraud would
support a cause of action against the lenders who were attempting to manip-
ulate the management of the debtor company.52
In another recent case in California a jury awarded a debtor $1 million in
punitive damages against a lender as a result of the lender's fraudulent repre-
sentations to the debtor. In Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of America 53 the debtor
critically needed additional funds. The lender represented that it would ad-
vance further financing in return for an assignment of all the debtor's ac-
counts receivable. At that time, however, the lender had determined not to
advance additional funds. Following the accounts receivable assignment,
the lender turned down the debtor's long-term loan application. At trial the
jury awarded the debtor $1 million in punitive damages, and the California
Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the decision. 54
In a similar sense, the lenders in Farah manipulated the management of
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 comment c (1977).
48. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977) states:
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or
law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in reli-
ance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused
to him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.
50. Id. § 527 states:
A representation that the maker knows to be capable of two interpretations, one
of which he knows to be false and the other true is fraudulent if it is made:
(a) with the intention that it be understood in the sense in which it is false,
or
(b) without any belief or expectation as to how it will be understood, or
(c) with reckless indifference as to how it will be understood.
51. 382 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 516 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir. 1975).
52. Id. at 1153.
53. 38 Cal. 3d 892, 701 P.2d 826, 215 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1985).
54. Id. at 898, 910, 701 P.2d at 830, 839, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 683, 692.
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FMC through a fraudulent course of conduct. The court found that the
lenders' statement that they would not grant a waiver of default if Farah
were elected chief executive officer was a misrepresentation of the lenders'
actual intentions. 5  According to the court the lenders intended the state-
ment to create the impression that they would declare and enforce a default
in the loan agreement upon Farah's election. 56 Donohoe, attorney for Re-
public, perpetuated the fraud in his conversations with Azar and Farah
when he threatened to bankrupt and padlock the company.57 The lenders
contended, on the other hand, that their written and oral statements under
the management change clause amounted to no more than the ordinary hard
bargaining characteristic of negotiations in the lending industry.58  The.
court disagreed with the lenders and stated that the representations of the
lenders amounted "to more than a mere opinion, judgment, probability or
expectation on the part of the lenders." 5 9
2. Duress.
FMC's cause of action for duress, like its fraud claim, focused upon the
lenders' letter of March 22, 1977, and upon the statements made by Repub-
lic's attorney Donohoe to Farah and other Board members on March 23,
1977, concerning the bankruptcy and padlocking of FMC. Additionally,
FMC based its duress claim upon the prevention of the election of Farah's
candidates for the Board. As a matter of law duress occurs when one person
unlawfully threatens another person, thereby causing that person to do that
which he otherwise would not do. 60 The existence of alternatives, i.e., bow
to the threat of duress or accept bankruptcy, does not preclude the possibil-
ity of duress. 61 Also referred to as business compulsion or economic coer-
cion, duress does not exist unless the threatened harm is imminent and no
present means of protection are available. 62 A claim of duress must, how-
55. 678 S.W.2d at 682.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 681-82.
58. The lenders' brief on appeal provides examples of legitimate acts in a bargaining con-
text that are misleading but not fraudulent including: a union's threat of strike intended to
effect higher wages; a landowner's posting of a sign stating "trespassers will be prosecuted;" a
lawyer's writing of a demand letter knowing that his client has not yet decided whether to sue.
Brief of Appellant at 91. The court apparently rejected these examples as mere statements of
opinion or expectation. 678 S.W.2d at 681-82.
59. 678 S.W.2d at 681-82.
60. See 13 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1602 (3d ed.
1970).
61. Id. § 1617.
62. See Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Stanley, 606 F. Supp. 558 (N.D. Ill.
1985). In Stanley the court distinguished between a threat of imminent harm and mere hard
bargaining. Id. at 562. Stanley alleged that, in light of the threat of imminent bankruptcy and
a cutoff of credit, he was forced to execute a personal guaranty in favor of the lenders to back
up an extension of credit to his company. The court rejected Stanley's assertion, stating that
"[d]uress does not exist merely where consent to an agreement is secured because of hard
bargaining positions or the pressure of financial circumstances." Id. The court concluded that
the lender's threat was not wrongful and that the threatened harm was not imminent. Id. The




ever, be based upon the conduct of the threatening party and not on the
preexisting vulnerability of the threatened party.63 Furthermore, the mere
exercise or threatened exercise of a valid legal right cannot form the basis of
a claim of economic coercion. 64
In Spillers v. Five Points Guaranty Bank 6 5 the court stated that duress
may exist if a party threatens to enforce legal rights that in fact are nonexis-
tent.66 The debtors in Spillers sought to prevent the foreclosure of certain
liens on their personal and real property. The debtors claimed that the lend-
ers coerced them into signing the various security documents at the time of
the execution of a renewal note. The court found that the debtors were co-
erced only in the sense that they could either agree or refuse to sign the
documents. 67 The natural consequence of refusal, however, was default and
acceleration of the debt, thereby resulting in the bankruptcy of the business.
Nevertheless, the court held that the lenders had a legal right to require the
execution of the security agreement; therefore, actionable duress did not
exist. 68
Arguably, the lenders in Farah, like the lenders in Spillers, acted pursuant
to a valid legal right, the right conferred by the management change clause
to declare a default and accelerate payment upon a change in the office of
chief executive officer of FMC.69 The Farah court concluded, however, that
actionable duress may exist when one enforces or threatens to enforce legal
rights in bad faith. 70 The court found that the lenders acted in bad faith by
threatening to declare a default and accelerate payment of the loan at a time
when FMC was not in default and no impaired prospect for repayment ex-
isted. 71 The Farah court stated that "[elven where an insecurity clause is
drafted in the broadest possible terms, the primary question is whether the
creditor's attempt to accelerate stemmed from a reasonable, good-faith belief
that its security was about to become impaired. ' ' 72 The court noted that
63. First Tex. Sav. Ass'n v. Dicker Center, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 179, 186 (Tex. App.-Tyler
1982, no writ) ("[s]tress of business conditions will not constitute duress unless the defendant
was responsible for that condition").
64. Sanders v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 389 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1965,
no writ) (no duress when bank lawfully refused to close sale prior to payment of past due rent);
see also 25 AM. JUR. 2D Duress and Undue Influence § 18 (1966) (threatening to exercise legal
right not duress).
65. 335 So. 2d 851 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
66. Id. at 852.
67. Id. at 852-53.
68. Id. at 853.
69. See supra note 24.
70. 678 S.W.2d at 684.
71. Id. at 685-86. The court, analogizing the management change clause to an insecurity
clause, cited the good faith acceleration requirement in § 1-208 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. For the text of § 1-208 see supra note 42. See also Brown v. Avemco Inv. Corp., 603
F.2d 1367, 1378-80 (9th Cir. 1979) (U.C.C. § 1-208 applies to "default acceleration clauses" as
well as "insecurity acceleration clauses").
72. 678 S.W.2d at 685. The Farah court seems to have relied on the implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing. In English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1983), however, the Texas
Supreme Court rejected the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing as a basis for action in
contract under Texas law. Id. at 522. The court stated: "The novel concept [of good faith and
fair dealing] would abolish our system of government according to settled rules of law and let
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Farah's election could have constituted a default enabling the lenders to en-
force their legal rights at the time.73 Instead, the lenders resorted to preelec-
tion threats and warnings designed to prevent the election of Farah. The
Farah court concluded that the duress did not result from FMC's preexisting
financial condition; rather, the duress turned on the threats of default, immi-
nent bankruptcy, and padlocking. 74
3. Interference.
FMC based its interference claim upon the lenders' conduct that led to the
reversal of Azar's vote and the rejection of Farah as a candidate for chief
executive officer of FMC. The lenders further interfered with FMC's lawful
corporate governance process by installing Conroy as chief executive officer,
forcing Farah's resignation as chairman of the Board, and thereafter substi-
tuting Foster as chairman. Additionally, the lenders packed the Board with
their own hand-picked representatives and installed Galef as consultant and
subsequently as chief executive officer. Furthermore, the lenders supported
the proxy fight against Farah as he lawfully attempted to regain control of
FMC.
An actionable claim for interference exists when one party intentionally
and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract by causing one
of the contracting parties not to perform under the contract. 75 Under the
common law theory of interference a lender could only be held liable for
specific acts of interference with specific contracts or prospective contractual
relations. 76 Although some courts have held that the theory of interference
will protect ordinary business relations, 77 the Farah court expanded the the-
ory of interference beyond mere business relations to afford legal protection
to the corporate governance rights of debtor corporations and their share-
holders. 78 Under Farah's unprecedented expansion of the interference the-
ory the establishment of a specific contract or prospective contractual
each case be decided upon what might seem 'fair and in good faith,' by each fact finder. This
we are unwilling to do." Id. The Farah court seems to have made an "end run" around the
Texas Supreme Court by judicially engrafting the good faith requirement onto the legal rights
exception to duress. By finding that the lenders did not act in good faith under the manage-
ment change clause, the Farah court converted the lenders' otherwise legal conduct into illegal
duress. For a further discussion of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing see infra
notes 121-42 and accompanying text.
73. 678 S.W.2d at 686.
74. Id. at 687.
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977):
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a con-
tract ... between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing
the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other
for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person
to perform the contract.
In a common law action based on interference a plaintiff need not show that the interfering
party acted with an intent to harm. A plaintiff must only show that the acts were willful and
intentional. 678 S.W.2d at 690.
76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766, 766A, 766B (1977).
77. See Melamed v. Lake County Nat'l Bank, 727 F.2d 1399, 1404 (6th Cir. 1984). For a
detailed discussion of Melamed see infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
78. 678 S.W.2d at 690.
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relationship does not seem to be essential to an actionable claim for interfer-
ence in a debtor's corporate governance. The court found that the lenders
had engaged in a course of conduct that interfered with FMC's business
relations and protected corporate rights.79 Among the protected rights was
the right of the shareholders and the company to competent, loyal manage-
ment elected through the corporate election process.8 0
The recent case Melamed v. Lake County National Bank 8 1 illustrates the
significance of the integrity of the corporate governance system and the
debtor's right to manage his own business relations free of undue creditor
interference.8 2 The trustee in bankruptcy in this case alleged several acts of
tortious interference: the lender replaced the debtor's accountant with one
selected by the lender;83 the lender retained final approval over all payments
made by the debtor; the lender developed a "13-Point Program" to help
salvage everything possible from the debtor; and the lender forced the presi-
dent of the debtor to take a fifty percent reduction in pay. The lender con-
tended that its actions were typical in workout situations and were justified
by the economic risks inherent with a troubled debtor. The court rejected
the lender's defense and ruled that the evidence was sufficient to support a
cause of action against the lender based upon interference. 84
Interference with a contract between others is privileged when the inter-
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 727 F.2d 1399 (6th Cir. 1984).
82. Id. at 1402.
83. The management of a corporation typically selects, appoints, and replaces the com-
pany's external auditor. Shareholder participation in the selection, appointment, and termina-
tion process is not required by any of the principal corporation codes in the United States.
Shareholder participation in this process is required, however, for corporations within the am-
bit of the Investment Companies Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to -52 (1982). See Ebke, In Search of
Alternatives. Comparative Reflections on Corporate Governance and the Independent Auditor's
Responsibilities, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 663, 714-15 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Ebke, In Search of
Alternatives]. A study conducted by Professor Hawes revealed that only a relatively small
percentage of corporations required to file proxy statements with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) invited shareholder participation in the selection, appointment, and re-
placement of independent auditors. Hawes, Stockholder Appointment of Independent Auditors:
A Proposal, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1974). Even when a corporation's bylaws require share-
holder participation in the process of selecting, appointing, and replacing the corporation's
external auditor, the legal effects of this participation remain unclear. In particular, it is un-
clear whether shareholder participation provisions prevent management dismissal of, or man-
agement demands for resignation by, independent auditors. Ebke, supra, at 715 n.286. For a
discussion of attempts by the SEC to secure the independence of external auditors of corpora-
tions subject to the registration requirements of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(g), 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1982), see: W. EBKE, WIRTSCHAFTSPRUEFER UND DRITrHAFTUNG 297-
317 (1983); St. Pierre, Independence and Auditor Sanctions, 7 J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 257,
260-61 (1984).
84. 727 F.2d at 1403-04. The court stated that the proper measure of damages for tor-
tious interference is the difference between the value of the business before and after the injury.
Id. at 1404. The business should be valued by capitalizing its business earnings over a reason-
able period of time. Id. The court found the amount of other creditors' claims irrelevant to
the calculation of damages for tortious interference. Id. A similar measure of damages has
been applied in actions based on the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. See K.M.C.




fering party does so in the bona fide exercise of his own rights.8 5 In Del
State Bank v. Salmon,86 for instance, the court found that, in certain situa-
tions, a lender may interfere with the business affairs of its debtor.8 7 In
Salmon the president of the debtor corporation was terminated as a result of
an alleged interference by the lender. The court rejected the former presi-
dent's claim and ruled that the lender's actions were privileged. 88 The court
stated that "[o]ne may lawfully interfere with the contractual relations of
another if by fair means, if accompanied by honest intent, and if to better
one's own business and not to principally harm another."'8 9 According to
the court the lender's privilege was based upon its desire to protect its eco-
nomic interest as a creditor. 90
Although the lenders in Farah may have acted to protect their legitimate
financial interest in FMC's business operations, the court ruled that such an
interest did not confer an absolute privilege to interfere in the debtor's af-
fairs.9 1 In assessing the extent of the lender's privilege, the court balanced
the social benefits of the lender's conduct against the resulting harm.92 Con-
cluding that the interference resulted in the election of inexperienced officers
and directors with questionable loyalty, the Farah court rejected the lender's
claim of privilege. 9 3
4. Concluding Remarks.
The foregoing discussion reveals that, for the most part, the theories ap-
plied in Farah are not unique. Farah is significant, however, because of its
application of the traditional theories of fraud, duress, and interference in
the context of a debtor-creditor relationship. Prior to Farah similar lender
liability cases were based upon the complex theories underlying the concepts
85. See Black Lake Pipe Line Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 538 S.W.2d 80, 91 (Tex. 1976)
("Interference with contractual relations is privileged where it results from the exercise of a
party's own rights or where the party possesses an equal or superior interest to that of the'
plaintiff in the subject matter."); see also 45 AM. JUR. 2D Interference § 27, at 304-05 (1969)
(interference not actionable when justifiable).
86. 548 P.2d 1024 (Okla. 1976).
87. Id. at 1027-28.
88. Id. at 1027.
89. Id.
90. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 769 (1977) (actor with financial
interest in business of person induced); id. § 773 (asserting bona fide claim).
91. 678 S.W.2d at 690.
92. Id. (citing Frank Coulson, Inc.-Buick v. General Motors Corp., 488 F.2d 202, 206
(5th Cir. 1974) (scope of privilege to interfere determined by weighing of social benefits)).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1977) lists the following social benefit factors for
evaluation of privileged interference:
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) the actor's motive,
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the
contractual interests of the other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference and
(g) the relations between the parties.
93. 678 S.W.2d at 690.
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of control and fiduciary relationships. Lender liability cases based solely
upon misuse of a controlling relationship are difficult, if not impossible, to
maintain successfully.
B. The Control Theories of Liability
A lender who assumes a controlling position vis-A-vis its debtor may be
considered to occupy a fiduciary position in relation to the debtor and the
other creditors of the debtor.94 Once accorded the status of a fiduciary, a
controlling lender must not misuse its control in relation to the debtor and
must act impartially toward competing creditors. Misuse of the fiduciary
relation may subject a lender to liability.
Control theories have developed under the instrumentality rule and
agency law principles. Liability under the instrumentality rule, also known
as the alter ego rule, may occur in cases when a creditor dominates a
debtor's business and financial affairs to the point that either the creditor
becomes the alter ego of the debtor or the debtor becomes the instrument of
the creditor. 95 Courts applying agency law principles may determine that a
controlling creditor has become a principal and the debtor has become its
agent. Under either the instrumentality or agency theory a controlling
lender must deal fairly and impartially with the debtor and the other credi-
tors of the debtor in matters involving the controlled debtor. If a controlling
lender breaches its fiduciary duty, its claims may be equitably subordinated
to those of the other creditors.96 The lender may also become liable to cer-
94. See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939). The Taylor case, also
known as the "Deep Rock" case, is regarded as the seminal case on creditor control. In Taylor
the creditor-parent controlled the affairs of the debtor-subsidiary through its preexisting stock
ownership in the debtor-subsidiary. The Supreme Court equitably subordinated the creditor's
claim due to the creditor's domination and misuse of the debtor and the creditor's lack of
impartiality toward the debtor. The Court relied, in part on Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250
U.S. 483 (1919). In Southern Pacific the Court stated: "It is the fact of control of the common
property held and exercised . . . that creates the fiduciary obligation." Id. at 492. For an
analysis of the Taylor case see Herzog & Zweibel, The Equitable Subordination of Claims in
Bankruptcy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 83, 104-07 (1961). See also DeBaun v. First W. Bank & Trust
Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d 686, 696-97, 120 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359-60 (1975) (bank, as controlling
shareholder of corporation, owes duty to minority shareholders and to controlled corporation
to investigate with due care prospective purchaser of stock).
Although cases involving the subordination of controlling shareholder claims are often re-
ferred to as coming within the Deep Rock doctrine, some commentators have questioned the
vitality of the doctrine. According to Professors Carey and Eisenberg, the doctrine "has been
interpreted so variously that question may be raised whether there is a 'doctrine' at all." W.
CAREY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 109 (5th ed. 1980)
(footnote omitted); see also Stroia, Deep Rock-A Post Mortem, 34 U. DET. L.J. 279, 296
(1957) (no Deep Rock doctrine exists).
95. Lundgren, Liability of a Creditor in a Control Relationship with Its Debtor, 67 MARQ.
L. REV. 523, 524 (1984). For a review of the case law supporting the instrumentality rule see
Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1102-07 (5th
Cir.), modifieldfactually, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1973), discussed more fully infra notes 102-06
and accompanying text.
96. In Bostian v. Schapiro (In re Kansas City Journal-Post Co.), 144 F.2d 791 (8th Cir.
1944), the court made the following observations:
[Equitable] [s]ubordination is a means of regulating distribution results in bank-
ruptcy by adjusting the order of creditors' payments to the equitable levels of
their comparative claim positions .... [I]ts fundamental aim is to undo or to
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tain third parties for debts incurred by the controlled debtor. The following
cases illustrate the application of the instrumentality rule and agency princi-
ples in the context of a debtor-creditor relationship.
Courts in the United States thus far have been reluctant to impose fiduci-
ary obligations on controlling creditors. 97  In In re W T Grant Co.98 the
court held that a creditor, in collecting its claim, owes no fiduciary duty to
the debtor or to other creditors. 99 In Grant the lenders allegedly manipu-
lated the debtor company to improve their own position to the detriment of
other creditors of the debtor. The lenders allegedly forced the debtor to
execute security agreements in favor of the lenders in order to secure previ-
ously unsecured loans and refused to make further loans to the debtor until
the security agreements were executed. The lenders also allegedly used their
influence over the debtor to delay a bankruptcy filing until the security inter-
ests of the lenders were perfected. The court ruled that a creditor may gen-
erally use his bargaining position, including refusal to grant further loans to
the debtor, in order to improve the status of existing debts. 10 The court
suggested that the lenders would have been derelict in their duty to their
own creditors and stockholders if they had not carefully monitored the activ-
offset any inequity in the claim position of a creditor that will produce injustice
or unfairness to other creditors in terms of the bankruptcy results. Its most
common uses perhaps are to nullify the effect of any fraud that a creditor has
committed, to prevent unjust enrichment in a fiduciary relation, and to make the
transactions of officers with the corporation conform to their sound realities in
the existing situation.
Id. at 800.
Several commentators have contributed to the body of legal literature on equitable subordi-
nation and creditor control. We recommend any of the following articles to the interested
reader: Chaitman, The Equitable Subordination of Bank Claims, 39 Bus. LAW. 1561 (1984);
DeNatale & Abram, The Doctrine of Equitable Subordination as Applied to Nonmanagement
Creditors, 40 Bus. LAW. 417 (1985); Douglas-Hamilton, Creditor Liabilities Resulting from
Improper Interference with the Management of a Financially Troubled Debtor, 31 Bus. LAW.
343 (1975); Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 94; Kunkel, The Fox Takes over the Chicken House:
Creditor Interference with Farm Management, 60 N.D.L. REV. 445 (1984); Lundgren, supra
note 95, at 523-24.
97. See In re Teltronics Serv., Inc., 29 Bankr. 139 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983). "In the rare
circumstance where a creditor exercises such control over the decision-making processes of the
debtor as amounts to a domination of its will, he may be held accountable for his actions under
a fiduciary standard." Id. at 170. The court in Teltronics, however, refused to find a fiduciary
relationship between the lender and the debtor and the debtor's other creditors. The lender
had no right to participate in the management of the debtor. The lender and debtor did not
share any common officers or directors. Although certain covenants gave the lender some
control over the borrower, the court concluded that the covenants were neither unconscionable
nor unusual. The covenants, inter alia, restricted additional borrowing by the debtor and per-
mitted lender input in the debtor's budgetary process. The court stated: "There is nothing
inherently wrong with a creditor carefully monitoring his debtor's financial situation .... or
with suggesting what course of action the debtor ought to follow." Id. at 172 (citation omit-
ted). See also In re Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co., 46 Bankr. 125 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 1985) (mere
offering of business advice to debtor is insufficient control to make lender liable as fiduciary);
In re Osborne, 42 Bankr. 988, 997 (W.D. Wis. 1984) (to establish a fiduciary relationship the
creditor must exercise almost complete control over the borrower's operation); Delta Diversi-
fied, Inc. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 171 Ga. App. 625, 320 S.E.2d 767, 776 (1984) (a confi-
dential relationship does not exist between a bank and its borrowers).
98. 699 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 89, 78 L. Ed. 2d 97 (1983).
99. Id. at 609.
100. Id. at 610.
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ities of the debtor.101
In Krivo Industrial Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chemical Corp.10 2
the court recognized that if a lender assumes "actual, participatory, total
control of the debtor" and if the lender misuses that control, the lender may
be liable as a fiduciary.10 3 Once again, however, the court refused to hold
the lender liable under the control theory. The court noted that ordinarily
imposition of a fiduciary obligation on a lender would discourage the exten-
sion of credit since the risks and liabilities would be too great.I°4 In Krivo
the lender agreed to take several steps to assist its financially troubled
debtor. The lender provided internal financial management assistance to
help the debtor cut costs. A lender representative was responsible for cash
management and other financial matters. As a co-signer on all checks he
had veto power over all payments. The lender also agreed to help the debtor
liquidate unprofitable holdings to provide more capital. The lender addi-
tionally agreed to intervene with the government on behalf of the debtor to
prevent cancellation of a major defense contract. Ten other creditors of the
debtor sought to hold the lender liable for the debts of the debtor company
under the instrumentality theory of control. The court found that at all
times the debtor existed as a separate and independent corporate body. 0 5
The court further ruled that "[m]erely taking an active part in the manage-
ment of the debtor corporation does not automatically constitute control...
by the creditor corporation."' 10 6
In A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc.,10 7 the court found that, by
virtue of its status as a controlling creditor, a lender may be liable to noncon-
trolling creditors of the debtor.108 In Jenson the noncontrolling aggrieved
creditors were farmers who had sold grain on credit to the debtor grain ele-
vator company. The court found that the controlling lender, a working capi-
tal financier, engaged in the following acts that led, in part, to liability as a
principal: (1) the lender obtained a right of first refusal on sales of grain held
by the debtor; (2) the lender obtained the right of approval over the debtor's
future mortgages, stock purchases, and dividend payments; (3) the lender
obtained the right of entry onto the debtor's premises to conduct periodic
checks and audits; (4) the lender included its name on all of the debtor's
financial correspondence; and (5) the lender determined that the debtor
needed "strong paternal guidance."' 0 9 The court found that the lender's
interference in the debtor's affairs constituted de facto control and thus es-
tablished an agency relationship." 0  Citing the Restatement (Second) of
101. Id.
102. 483 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir.), modified factually, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1973).
103. 483 F.2d at 1105.
104. Id. at 1104.
105. Id. at 1109.
106. Id. at 1105.
107. 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981).
108. Id. at 291.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 290.
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Agency, 11 the court concluded that the controlling lender was liable as a
principal for the acts of the debtor in connection with the business.112
Because the theory of agency necessarily embodies fiduciary principles, 11 3
the Jenson court implicitly recognized that a controlling creditor may owe a
fiduciary duty to its debtor. Under the agency theory the benefit of this duty
extends to all noncontrolling competing creditors that may have been in-
jured by the misuse of the controlling relationship.114 As established in Jen-
son, a noncontrolling competing creditor may even look beyond the trustee
in bankruptcy to the controlling lender in satisfaction of its claim.
The Jenson opinion may be limited, however, to its specific facts and cir-
cumstances. By virtue of its right of first refusal on grain sales, the control-
ling creditor seems to have taken a proprietary interest in the affairs of the
debtor. In light of this factor and the inherent propensity of courts in agri-
cultural states to protect the interests of farmers, the Jenson opinion may not
be as extreme as it initially appears. Controlling and noncontrolling credi-
tors, however, must be aware of the Jenson approach as a potential source of
lender liability. 11 5
In another recent case a federal court found that the lender exercised con-
trol over the debtor in a manner detrimental to the debtor's unsecured credi-
tors. In In re American Lumber Co. 116 the lender breached its fiduciary duty
as a controlling creditor by taking possession of the debtor's plant and by
exercising control over the debtor's financial affairs. In addition to receiving
all of the debtor's incoming mail, including payments on accounts receiva-
ble, the lender approved all payments to other creditors, but only if the pay-
ment enhanced the lender's position. The lender also required a substantial
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14 0 (1958) states: "A creditor who assumes
control of his debtor's business for the mutual benefit of himself and his debtor, may become a
principal, with liability for the acts and transactions of the debtor in connection with the busi-
ness." Id. comment a further provides:
[A] security holder who merely exercises a veto power over the business acts of
his debtor by preventing purchases or sales above specified amounts does not
thereby become a principal. However, if he takes over the management of the
debtor's business either in person or through an agent, and directs what con-
tracts may or may not be made, he becomes a principal, liable as any principal
for the obligations incurred thereafter in the normal course of business by the
debtor who has now become his general agent. The point at which the creditor
becomes a principal is that at which he assumes de facto control over the con-
duct of his debtor, whatever the terms of the formal contract with his debtor
may be.
112. 309 N.W.2d at 290.
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958) states:
(1) Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of
consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and
subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.
(2) The one for whom action is to be taken is the principal.
(3) The one who is to act is the agent.
114. 309 N.W.2d at 290.
115. See also Connor v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 616,
619, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 376, 379 (1968) (rejecting contention that lender liable as joint venturer
with debtor, but imposing liability based on lender's negligent supervision of debtor).
116. 5 Bankr. 470 (D. Minn. 1980).
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reduction in the salaries of the debtor's corporate officers and terminated all
of the debtor's employees.
The court found that the lender utilized its power as a controlling creditor
in a manner that injured the other creditors of the debtor. 117 As a result, the
court equitably subordinated the lender's claim to the claims of the other
unsecured creditors."18 The lender contended that subordination of the
lender's claim would cause other lenders to foreclose immediately their se-
curity interests and collect debts from financially troubled debtors rather
than engage in workout practices. The court rejected the lender's question-
ably noble motives and stated that the lender's conduct in the case could not
be allowed to prevail.1 19
The American Lumber case is particularly instructive in light of the rem-
edy awarded. Although the controlling lender engaged in a course of con-
duct characterized by fraud, misuse, lack of impartiality, and interference,
the court granted subordination rather than damages. The noncontrolling
competing creditors no doubt would have pursued another theory of lender
liability if the bankruptcy estate of the debtor following subordination would
have been insufficient to satisfy the creditors' claims.
In sum, the foregoing cases demonstrate the difficulty of maintaining an
action for damages against a lender based upon a control theory. Except in
suits for equitable subordination the courts appear reluctant to extend fiduci-
ary principles to the debtor-creditor relationship. In contrast to the total
domination of the debtor required in the control theory cases, liability based
upon the Farah theories requires only the allegation and proof of fraud, du-
ress, or interference. While Farah involved creditor control, the court did
not find it necessary to rely upon the complex control theories.120 The facts
in Farah easily pointed to liability under the straightforward common law
tort theories applied by the Farah court.
C. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Recently, some courts in the United States have held that a lender may be
liable to its debtor for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. 121 Whether such liability is based upon the common law or upon
117. Id. at 478.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 478-79.
120. See State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 669 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1984, writ dism'd by agr.) (only fraud, duress, and interference issues decided at trial court
level). FMC's petition alleged that: (1) the lenders wrongfully controlled and dominated
FMC's business affairs; (2) the lenders therefore owed a fiduciary duty to the company; and
(3) the lenders subsequently breached that fiduciary duty. See Plaintiff's Second Amended
Petition at 22 (copy on file at offices of Southwestern Law Journal). During discovery the
relative simplicity of the case became apparent, and the control theories were dropped.
121. See K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 763 (6th Cir. 1985); Alaska
Statebank v. Fairco, 674 P.2d 288, 293 (Alaska 1983); First Nat'l Bank v. Twombly, 689 P.2d
1230 (Mont. 1984). Although the concept of good faith and fair dealing cannot be precisely
defined, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 comment d (1981) provides the following
examples of conduct constituting bad faith: "evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of dili-
gence and slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of a power to specify
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the Uniform Commercial Code, 12 2 liability for breach of good faith may
have far reaching consequences for lenders and their financially troubled
debtors. 123 As the following cases demonstrate, lenders face the possibility
of substantial adverse judgments under the good faith theory.
In K.MC. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.124 the jury awarded the debtor $7.5
million in damages as a result of the lender's bad faith refusal to finance the
debtor's operations. 125 After experiencing severe financial difficulties the
debtor in K MC. requested the lender to advance funds up to the credit limit
on a preexisting, fully secured demand note. Motivated, at least in part, by a
personality conflict between the loan officer and the debtor, the lender de-
nied the request. Because all of the accounts receivable of the debtor were
deposited in a "blocked account" maintained by the creditor, the debtor ex-
isted at the whim of the creditor. The refusal to lend left the debtor with no
access to working capital. As a direct result thereof, the debtor's business
collapsed.
Relying upon the Uniform Commercial Code, 12 6 the court held that, ab-
sent a valid business reason, the creditor was under a duty of good faith to
notify the debtor of its refusal to lend. 127  According to the court notice
would have afforded the debtor a reasonable opportunity to seek alternative
financing, thereby preventing the failure of the business. 1 28  The KMC
court held the creditor liable for the difference between the value of the
debtor as a going concern immediately before the advance was refused and
the debtor's value after that date. 1 29 K. M C demonstrates that notice prior
to action is an essential component of the developing liability theory of good
faith and fair dealing. 130
In another recent case the court held a lender liable under the good faith
terms, and interference with or the failure to cooperate in the other party's performance." For
a review of the development of the tort doctrine of good faith and fair dealing see Seaman's
Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 774-84, 686 P.2d 1158, 1170-77,
206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 366-73 (1984) (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
122. For a review of the good faith sections of the Uniform Commercial Code see supra
note 42.
123. One commentator characterized the cause of action based on the duty of good faith
and fair dealing as "a loose cannon ... [which] may be used by courts to further their views of
justice." Burke, Thomas & Warren, Emerging Theories of Bank Liability, in BANKS AND
THEIR BORROWERS: NEW OPPORTUNITIES IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 403, 458 (1984).
124. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
125. Id. at 766. But see Brown-Marx Assocs., Ltd. v. Emigrant Say. Bank, 527 F. Supp.
277 (N.D. Ala. 1981), aff'd, 703 F.2d 1361 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (under Alabama law, no cause of
action in tort for bad faith despite bank's alleged intentional, malicious refusal to advance
funds pursuant to loan commitment).
126. U.C.C. § 2-309 comment 8 (1977) states that "the application of principles of good
faith and sound commercial practice normally call for such notification of the termination of a
going contract relationship as will give the other party reasonable time to seek a substitute
arrangement."
127. 757 F.2d at 759.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 764.
130. One court recently recognized, however, that the UCC good faith requirement does
not apply to a demand for payment on a demand note. In Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Willis Denney
Ford, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 846, 269 S.E.2d 916 (1980), the debtor sued a lender for damages
allegedly resulting from the lender's bad faith termination of a demand note. The court ex-
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theory following the wrongful acceleration of a debtor's note. In First Na-
tional Bank v. Twombly 131 the loan officer responsible for a note had agreed
to convert the debtor's $3,500 secured promissory note into an installment
note in order to assist the debtor in repayment of the loan. Because the loan
officer was temporarily out of town, the vice president of the lender was
responsible for preparing the documents to convert the note. The vice presi-
dent, however, claimed that he knew nothing about the conversion agree-
ment and refused to convert the promissory note. The vice president
subsequently declared the promissory note due and drafted an offset against
the debtor's checking account. The debtor was left with a minimal checking
account balance and approximately $850.00 of his checks were dishonored.
The jury found that the lender breached its statutory duty of good faith and
fair dealing by wrongfully accelerating the note and offsetting the debtor's
checking account.' 32 The jury further found that the lender made false rep-
resentations to the debtor concerning the conversion of the note. 133
Although the loan agreement expressly precluded punitive. damages, the
court, on appeal, found that such damages may be awarded when the duty of
good faith exists as a matter of law rather than as part of the contract
itself. ' 34
The duty of good faith and fair dealing has also been extended to the
wrongful repossession of collateral. In Alaska Statebank v. Fairco 135 a se-
curity agreement provided that if the debtor missed a payment on a $50,000
pressly rejected the debtor's contention that the duty of good faith under U.C.C. § 1-208 modi-
fied the fundamental nature of demand note financing. The court stated:
The obligor, by his signature, has agreed that his obligation is on its face "imme-
diately" due and payable and is subject to no other contingencies. Qualifying
that obligation by requiring that the holder demonstrate his "good faith" in
seeking payment can have no beneficial result for either the holders or the mak-
ers of demand instruments.
269 S.E.2d at 918-19; see also Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42, 48 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1985) (parties by the demand note agreed payment would be made whenever demand
was made, not whenever demand was made in good faith); Allied Sheet Metal Fabricators, Inc.
v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 10 Wash. App. 530, 518 P.2d 734, 738 n.5, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 967
(1974) (good faith under U.C.C. § 1-203 not fact question in determining a lender's right to
call demand note).
131. 689 P.2d 1226 (Mont. 1984).
132. Id. at 1230. For text of U.C.C. § 1-208 dealing with good faith acceleration see supra
note 42.
133. 689 P.2d at 1230.
134. Id. The court's decision on punitive damages is subject to criticism for at least two
reasons. First, U.C.C. § 1-106 (1977) expressly prohibits the imposition of any punitive rem-
edy. Damage remedies under the Uniform Commercial Code are strictly compensatory in
nature. Second, courts should impose punitive damages only if the creditor is, or should be,
aware that his conduct is prohibited. The theory of the duty of good faith provides no identifi-
able standards of prohibited conduct. Punitive damages therefore should not be awarded
under the good faith theory. Awarding punitive damages under the good faith theory is incon-
sistent with more fundamental notions of fairness. See generally Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency
in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 33-53, 76 (1982) (vagueness of criteria
and discretion given juries in punitive damage cases causes unfair punitive damage liability);
Comment, Sailing the Uncharted Seas of the Bad Faith: Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc.
v. Standard Oil Co., 69 MINN. L. REV. 1161, 1187-89, 1197-98 (1985) (punitive damage
awards improper in commercial setting when standards of conduct uncertain).
135. 674 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983).
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note, the debt would become immediately due and payable. The agreement
provided further that the lender could proceed to enforce payment without
notice upon default. After the debtor missed two quarterly payments, the
senior vice president of the lender assumed responsibility for the note. Fol-
lowing a series of incompleted restructuring negotiations, the lender decided
to proceed against the collateral. The lenders, accompanied by a locksmith
and a police officer, entered the debtor's business with "an air of self-impor-
tance."' 36 The debtor's customers were asked to leave, the locks of the store
were changed, and the debtor's receipts and accounts were secured. The
following day, the debtor regained control of its business and filed suit
against the creditor.
The court held that the creditor had breached its duty of good faith to the
debtor by failing to notify to the debtor prior to taking possession of the
collateral. 137 The court found that by virtue of the incompleted restructur-
ing negotiations the loan agreement was modified and the loan was not in
default.' 38 The lender, therefore, had no contractual or statutory right to
proceed against the collateral.' 39 According to the court the duty of good
faith required the creditor to notify the debtor in advance of its intention to
repossess the collateral. 14° As a result of the lender's breach of that obliga-
tion the court awarded the debtor approximately $50,000 in damages,
$35,000 of which were punitive damages."4 1
As the foregoing cases illustrate, the duty of good faith, by its very nature,
provides no objectively identifiable guidelines concerning the bounds of le-
gally permissible conduct. The duty of good faith and fair dealing simply
instructs the lender that "it is right to do right." Yet, in commercial affairs
such a mandate is, without further delineation, formless and inconsistent
with the basic notion of fairness that notice be given as to what activities are
legally permitted or prohibited. 42 If the objective of a legal system is to
promote certainty in human affairs, and the authors believe it is, the action-
able theory of good faith and fair dealing is too broad and inconcrete to serve
as a basis of lender liability, as no workable limits to liability exist. Judicial
interpretations thus far have not provided clear boundaries of acceptable
conduct and the case-by-case approach, while appropriate for a remedial
sanction such as an injunction, is not appropriate for the remedy of damages.
D. Prima Facie Tort
At the leading edge of common law lender liability theories is the prima
136. Id. at 290.
137. Id. at 292-93.
138. Id. at 292.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 296.
142. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 n.20 (1980) ("a judicial holding that
certain undefined activities 'generally are prohibited' by § 10(b) (of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934] would raise questions whether either criminal or civil defendants would be given
fair notice that they have engaged in illegal activity").
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facie tort doctrine. 143 Under the prima facie tort theory a lawful act unjusti-
fiably performed with an intent to harm another is unlawful and makes the
actor liable for damages.4 A cause of action under the prima facie tort
theory may not be brought, however, if the conduct is actionable under an
existing, well-defined cause of action. 145 The prima facie tort theory is func-
tionally and theoretically distinguishable from the actionable implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing in that it sounds in tort while the duty of good
faith and fair dealing sounds in contract and tort. The theories are, however,
indistinguishable in application. Both theories require the fact finder to as-
sess the mental state of the actor in the absence of clearly defined standards
of unacceptable conduct. The prima facie tort theory, as well as the duty of
good faith and fair dealing, is merely "a philosophical effort to state all tort
law in a single sentence rather than an effort to state a meaningful
principle." 146
While the number of jurisdictions that have adopted the prima facie tort
doctrine thus far has been relatively small, 147 the doctrine will no doubt have
a substantial impact upon the scope and magnitude of lender liability. For
example, in Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc. 148 the lender was held liable
under the prima facie tort theory for wrongfully calling a $900,000 secured
demand note. In August 1981 the lender notified the debtor that the out-
standing demand note would continue for only sixty days. The lender's con-
duct was motivated by the declining quality of the debtor's collateral and by
pressure from bank examiners. Contrary to its representations, however, the
lender continued to advance funds and cooperate with the debtor well into
December 1981. On December 15, 1981, the lender made formal demand
for payment on the note. Two weeks later the lender took possession of the
assets and accounts receivable of the debtor.
143. For an in-depth discussion of the legal and theoretical foundations of the prima facie
tort theory see: Bandag of Springfield, Inc. v. Bandag, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 546, 551-54 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983); Porter v. Crawford & Co., 611 S.W.2d 265, 268-72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (implic-
itly adopting prima facie tort doctrine in Missouri); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870
and comments (1977); Forkosch, supra note 41, at 465-82; Note, Prima Facie Tort Recognized
in Missouri, 47 Mo. L. REV. 553, 555-60 (1983); Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine in
Missouri: Commission of a Lawful Act with Intent to Injure May Result in Liability, 50 UMKC
L. REV. 128, 129-38 (1981); Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 1191, 1201-31 (1967 & Supp. 1985).
144. Porter v. Crawford & Co., 611 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); see also Luxon-
omy Cars, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 65 A.D.2d 549, 408 N.Y.S.2d 951, 954 (1978) (valid business
interest justified lender's actions and precluded liability under prima facie tort theory); Motif
Constr. Corp. v. Buffalo Sav. Bank, 50 A.D.2d 718, 374 N.Y.S.2d 868, 870 (1975) (same);
Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1894) ("the intentional infliction
of temporal damage, or the doing of an act manifestly likely to inflict such damage and in-
flicting it, is actionable if done without just cause").
145. Bandag of Springfield, Inc. v. Bandag, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 546, 552 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983);
Forkosch, supra note 41, at 481.
146. Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations, 34 ARK. L. REV. 335, 345
(1980). But see Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 474, 475 n. 1 (1909) (classifying prima facie tort doctrine
as one of four general bases for tort liability).
147. The majority of cases construing the prima facie tort doctrine have been decided by
courts applying the laws of Missouri and New York. See Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 1191, 1201-31
(1967 & Supp. 1985) (citing cases).
148. 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
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The debtor filed suit against the lender alleging that, although the lender's
conduct was lawful, the lender's intent was to injure the debtor. The jury
returned a verdict against the lenders in excess of $7.5 million, consisting of
approximately $1.5 million in actual damages and $6 million in punitive
damages. 14 9 The trial court entered judgment on the verdict, but reduced
the punitive damage award to $3 million. 150 A Missouri court of appeals,
however, reversed the trial court, concluding that the lender's conduct was
justified by legitimate business interests to reduce losses resulting from high
risk loans. 15 1
The continued existence of a viable commercial society depends, at least in
part, on the ability of business enterprises to structure their operations and
plan for the future. Planning requires an evaluation of the opportunities and
risks associated with the known and unknown. Unpredictable legal liability
complicates planning by enhancing the risks and expanding the unknowns in
the legal environment of business. In commercial affairs legal liability must
be based upon known, objective standards; therefore, the prima facie tort
theory, like the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, should not
be used by courts as a base of lender liability.
III. EMERGING THEORIES OF LENDER LIABILITY IN PERSPECTIVE
A. General Observations. An Uncommon Common Law Experience
At first glance Farah and the other cases discussed in the preceding sec-
tion of this Article are but another example of the major transition that is
taking place in the United States: From a society that traditionally has been
based upon the idea of private assumption of risks the United States is ex-
ploding into a compensation-oriented society that uses the laws of civil liabil-
ity and insurance as vehicles to spread risks and socialize losses. We are not
the first to speak of this transformation; it is no new idea. In fact, the trans-
formation is no longer an idea; it is reality.152 Because traditional concepts
of risk distribution between the principal actors in the market place and the
public served us so well for so long, their demise was, for many lawyers,
unthinkable. Yet, gradually our devotion to traditional principles of liabil-
ity, such as the principle of caveat emptor, began to give way to a new orien-
tation toward monetary compensation. 15 3
Farah is not the first case to break out of the traditional framework of
debtor-creditor relationships. On the contrary, lender liability is a legal and
an economic reality, not an abstraction. Farah will serve, however, as a legal
catalyst in an increasingly liability-oriented environment. The Farah case
149. Id. at 44.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 55.
152. For a critical analysis of tort law and contemporary compensation systems see Flem-
ing, Is There a Future for Tort, 44 LA. L. REV. 1193 (1984); Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort
Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555 (1985).
153. See Bartlett & Lapatin, supra note 39, at 639; Ebke, In Search of Alternatives, supra
note 83, at 680-93; Comment, Accountant's Liability to the Third Party and Public Policy: A
Calabresi Approach, 39 Sw. L.J. 689 (1985).
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reflects the notion that the judiciary's traditional reluctance to hold banks
liable in the context of their dealings with their debtors is fading away and
that in its place is rising a new body of easier-to-prove, behaviorally oriented
rules of liability. Banks no longer have the luxury of operating within an
environment relatively free from the risk of liability.
Farah may thus far be the only case applying traditional liability theories,
such as fraud, duress, and interference, jointly to the debtor-lender relation-
ship, but it is certainly not the only case in which a bank has been held liable
to its debtor. Many American courts have gone in the direction of ex-
panding the liabilities of banks and other lending institutions to their cus-
tomers, even in cases less extreme on their facts than Farah. Not
surprisingly, therefore, the debate of the pros and cons of the emerging theo-
ries of lender liability ensues. 154 The growing body of legal literature and
case law shows an increasing consensus among courts and commentators in
the United States that only adherence to unrestricted liability standards will,
in the end, be sufficient to protect the interests of all concerned. Judges and
commentators apparently are not sure that the banks, who formulate the
terms of the legal relationship between themselves and their debtors, are
serving the best interests of the debtors rather than their own interests. Re-
grettably, the expediency of the developing liability concepts thus far has
been questioned only rarely. 155
Both proponents and critics will agree that they knew about most of the
154. For a complete and informative discussion of the emerging theories of lender liability
see 1-3 EMERGING THEORIES OF LENDER LIABILITY (H. Chaitman ed. 1985) [hereinafter
cited as EMERGING THEORIES].
155. But see Amicus Curiae Brief of the Missouri Bankers Association in Support of Ap-
pellant-Respondent Centerre Bank of Kansas City, N.A., reprinted in 2 EMERGING THEORIES,
supra note 154, at 1176. The Missouri Bankers Association stated:
The trial court's judgment presents a dangerous precedent to all Missouri
banks and borrowers who have occasion to resort to demand note financing ....
Without doubt, loose application of an undefined and unlimited liability theory
to the simple act of calling a demand note could wreak havoc on the ability of
Missouri banks to make proper evaluation. Thus, faced with uncertain risks and
potentially enormous liability exposure in collecting such notes, Missouri banks
likely will be forced to change the terms and increase the cost at which financing
is made available to Missouri borrowers. This result obviously would be detri-
mental both to Missouri banks and borrowers and to the public at large, many
of whom enjoy the benefits of capital investments made by Missouri borrowers.
Id. at 1195-96; see also Petition for Hearing, Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 163
Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, reprinted in 2 EMERGING THEORIES, supra note 154, at
871. United California Bank argued that:
Allowing the tort of bad faith to apply to banks will adversely affect their
financial security .... [T]he tort permits large, inherently speculative damage
awards for emotional distress, coupled with even larger, less controlled awards
of punitive damages. Such awards could easily threaten the financial security of
many banks. Particularly now, when banks are faced by numerous threats to
their financial security and when more banks are failing than at any time since
the Great Depression, it is not the time to make matters worse by subjecting
banks to potentially disastrous awards of emotional distress damages and puni-
tive damages.
Id. at 897 (footnote omitted). Commercial Cotton is noted in Kitada, Emerging Theories of




theories of liability asserted against the defendants in Farah, but that the
Farah court for the first time put these theories together and applied them to
a case of a bank's undue interference in its borrower's business. The Farah
controversy, however, is only an individual event, with an unusual factual
background; thus, the case will begin to make sense only through considera-
tion of the common law system as well as the system of banking and finan-
cial institutions law within which the case was decided and will operate and
have practical effects. These systems thus deserve special attention.
Let us end our discussion of Farah with an analysis of the probable conse-
quences and the possible import of the Texas court's holdings on banking
and financial institutions and the public as a whole. Certainly, because of
the extreme factual conditions of the Farah case, no one can predict at this
point the exact shape and the parameters of lenders' duties to their debtors
under the common law liability theories of fraud, duress, and interference.
To attempt to describe the scope and contents of the responsibilities and
liabilities of banks and other lending institutions after Farah would be to
play futuristic guessing games that may prove to be inaccurate or incom-
plete. Lawyers should not lend themselves to any such speculation as to the
future, for, to put it in the frequently cited words of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, "[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing
more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." 156
This notion should not prevent lawyers from assisting courts in their en-
deavor to shape the law of the future or from encouraging legislative action
when existing law proves to be inadequate to respond to foreseeable societal
needs in the foreseeable future. In his book Tort Law in America: An Intel-
lectual History Professor G. Edward White demonstrates persuasively the
seminal role that academicians play in the intellectual upheaval of modem
tort law.1 57 If they in fact are an influential and authoritative force in the
evolution of tort law, academicians should be aware that, ultimately, they
are ethically accountable to the persons and institutions affected by the doc-
trinal changes in the law of lender liability. Given this special responsibility,
lawyers need to anticipate the foreseeable future by learning from both the
present and the past, with the understanding that destiny is what counts, not
current trends.15 8 Legal theories of lender liability are emerging so rapidly
that lawyers do not have time to react; instead, lawyers in their respective
capacities as judges, legislators, attorneys, administrators, or academicians
must now exercise analytical ingenuity and engage in creative imagination to
be able to cope with the problem of how the position of lenders vis-a-vis
debtors can be secured without violations of the debtors' interests.
Prospective developments should, however, build upon established legal
principles. The law regulating banking and other financial institutions
reveals a strong traditional momentum reflecting conservative attitudes and
156. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).
157. G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (1980).
158. See generally Ebke, Enforcement Techniques Within the European Communities: Fly-
ing Close to the Sun With Waxen Wings, 50 J. AIR L. & CoM. 685, 723 (1985).
[Vol. 40
LENDER LIABILITY
the fear of costly mistakes. Similar considerations apply to the common law
and statutory theories of liability of lending institutions to their debtors.
These theories need to be developed cautiously because radical changes will
have undesirable consequences.
In their endeavor to shape the law of lender liability judges assume a spe-
cial responsibility. Judges do not write for individual cases alone. When
they decide actual cases on the basis of law and equity, judges are contribut-
ing to the formation of a jurisprudence that will directly affect similar cases
in the future, not merely the case at the court's hand. Judges are thus re-
sponsible for both continuity and innovation in the law of lender liability.
In the remainder of this Article we shall attempt to put the holding of
Farah and the legal theories relied upon by the Farah court, as well as other
courts, in proper legal and economic perspective. We risk displeasing the
numerous tort law experts and banking law specialists who can argue that to
take the lead in shaping banking duties in light of the unsettled responsibili-
ties of lenders is too speculative and risky. We also risk displeasing con-
sumerists who will tend to resent the idea of reconsidering liability theories
that allegedly well serve the consuming public's interests. Yet, we think our
undertaking is worth the risk.
B. The Place of Lender's Liability in the Control of Lender's Conduct
1. The Changing Environment.
Lender liability theories are emerging at a time of transition for banks and
other commercial lending institutions in the United States. 15 9 The succes-
sive deregulation of interest rates, 16 the gradual erosion of traditional
boundaries between banks and savings institutions, 161 the evolving system of
interstate banking, 162 and the growing significance of so-called nonbank
banks163 have increased competition and taken away limits that traditionally
cushioned financial institutions. Whether or not viewed as a blessing, the
increased competition between and among commercial lenders has created
159. For a discussion of the history of banking in the United States see: B. HAMMOND,
BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR (1957); M.
MYERS, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1970).
160. See, e.g., J. HAWKE, COMMENTARIES ON BANKING REGULATION 245-79 (1985);
Loring & Brundy, The Deregulation of Banks, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347 (1985); Norton,
The 1982 Banking Act and the Deregulation Scheme, 38 Bus. LAW. 1627 (1983); Wynne &
Spagnola, The Myth of Bank Deregulation: For Every Action There is an Equal and Opposite
Reaction, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 383 (1985).
161. See W. LOVETr, BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS LAW 22 (1984).
162. Brown & Randall, Interstate Banking in Florida, 102 BANKING L.J. 33 (1985); Cohen,
Interstate Banking: Myth and Reality, 18 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 965 (1985); Dunnan, The Wild
World of Interstate Banking, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1986, at 54.
163. See, e.g., Dimension Fin. Corp. v. Board of Governors, 744 F.2d 1402, 1404-09 (10th
Cir. 1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 681 (1986); First Bancorp. v. Board of Governors, 728 F.2d 434,
435-37 (10th Cir. 1984); Wilshire Oil Co. v. Board of Governors, 668 F.2d 732, 732-40 (3d Cir.
198 1), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1132 (1982); Felsenfeld, supra note 2, at 108-11; Schellie & Climo,
Nonbank Banks: Current Status and Opportunities, 102 BANKING L.J. 4 (1985). For a discus-
sion of the Dimension case see Comment, Banking Law: A Bank is a Bank is a Bank: Dimen-
sion Financial Services v. Board of Governors, 11 J. CORP. L. 277 (1986).
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an environment in which financial institutions seem more and more inclined
to pursue aggressive and expansionary growth programs in the course of
which safe and sound banking practices too often seem to be sacrificed in
favor of rapid growth and expansion. These practices result in substantial
deterioration in the quality of loan portfolios and sometimes result in signifi-
cant losses. 164 The economic strains in some sectors of the economy, such as
agriculture, real estate, and energy,1 65 as well as problems in international
lending transactions, 166 are contributing factors to the deterioration of loan
portfolios.
As a result, bank failures in the United States in 1985 exceeded the record
set in 1984.167 The former chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (FDIC), William Isaac, recently predicted that in 1986 as many as
two hundred bank failures will occur, 168 although the majority of banks in
the United States are doing better than ever. 169 Ironically, the availability of
depositor insurance, such as the insurance provided by the FDIC170 and the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC),171 appears to
164. See Bank Failures in 1985 Exceed Record Set in 1984, WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No.
45, at 394 (Sept. 16, 1985).
165. Id.
166. For an account of the origins of problems in international lending transactions, see: C.
BERGSTEN, W. CLINE & T. WILLIAMSON, BANK LENDING TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
THE POLICY ALTERNATIVES (1985); W. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT: SYSTEMIC RISK
AND POLICY RESPONSE 1-9 (1984).
167. The total number of bank failures in 1985 was 120, thus topping 1984's post-depres-
sion record of 79. See Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1986, at 5, col. 3. The 1985 total appears dramatic
considering that, between 1934 and 1981, only 722 banks failed, including both FDIC-insured
and noninsured banks. W. LOVETT, supra note 161, at 112. Most bank failures involve small,
thinly capitalized financial institutions. For a brief discussion of statutory minimum capital
requirements in the United States see id. at 106-07.
168. See FDIC Chairman Predicts More Bank Failures, Dallas Times Herald, Oct. 6, 1985,
at A13.
169. Bankers Monthly, Jan. 1986, at 29.
170. The FDIC was established by the Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48
Stat. 162, 168 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1982)). For early dis-
cussions of this statute see: Willis, The Banking Act of 1933 in Operation, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
697 (1935); Comment, The Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933, 47 HARV. L. REV. 325 (1933).
The FDIC's original purposes included protection of bank despositors, maintenance and im-
provement of confidence in the banking system, and promotion of safe and sound banking
practices. The Act required all members of the Federal Reserve System, including both na-
tional banks and state chartered banks, to obtain insurance through the FDIC. Then, as now,
the insurance was also available to applying nonmember state chartered banks that qualified.
The FDIC's initial capital was provided by the Treasury and the Federal Reserve District
Bank's surplus. Modest insurance premiums paid by the insured banks replenished the
FDIC's capital. See generally J. HURST, A LEGAL HISTORY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1774-1970, at 59-60, 200 (1973); Harl, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 6
CORP. REORGANIZATIONS & AM. BANKR. REV. 253 (1947). Today, virtually all banks,
whether national or state chartered, are members of the FDIC because most depositors want
this protection. W. LOVETr , supra note 161, at 51. For a discussion of the rights and duties of
the FDIC vis-A-vis stockholders and creditors of a failed bank see Skillern, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation and the Failed Bank. The Past Decade (pts. 1 & 2), 99 BANKING L.J.
233, 292 (1982).
171. The FSLIC was created in 1934 to offer deposit account insurance for savings and
loans and savings banks. National Housing Act, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246, 1255 (1934) (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1274-1735 (1982)). Later, savings banks set up their own state
insurance systems. The compulsory state savings bank insurance system in Massachusetts is
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have contributed, to some degree, to this development as it protects against
the normal risks and natural consequences of bank failures. 172 Yet, leaving
aside potential failures of banks, the new competitive atmosphere has af-
fected commercial lending transactions as banks are taking bigger risks in
both lending and borrowing activity. The increase in problem loans has trig-
gered workout practices 173 that, in turn, have come under increasing attack
by debtors, shareholders, bankruptcy trustees, competing creditors, and
others.
Whether or not courts endorse the changes in the legal and economic en-
vironment, they must respond to them, and the response has been the evolu-
tion of a compensation system. To implement the policy of safe and sound
banking while maintaining the balance between lender and debtor, courts
began to apply complex liability theories, such as control and fiduciary duty
principles, with the application of easier-to-prove fraud, duress, and interfer-
ence theories now on the horizon. Courts also will not hesitate to resort to
novel and still unsettled liability theories, such as prima facie tort and civil
RICO. 174 The rise of consumer legislation in the 1970s and its impact upon
commercial lending institutions175 facilitated the evolution of the compensa-
tion system because this legislation changed lawyers' views and perceptions
of adequate risk distribution in commercial lending transactions. As a re-
still in operation. State insurance plans were established in New York and Connecticut; when
these state insurance plans terminated, savings banks in those jurisdictions joined the FDIC.
Today, the majority of savings banks in most states except Massachusetts are members of the
FDIC. In Massachusetts a few savings banks are members of the FDIC insurance plan as well
as the state insurance system. W. LovErTr, supra note 161, at 208-09.
172. Theoretically, strong banks should pay lower insurance premiums than banks that are
financially more vulnerable. As a practical matter, however, bank regulators cannot make
such distinctions publicly without damaging the reputation and deposit business of weaker
banks. An additional complication is that some of the largest banks in the United States with
heavy international commitments and loan assets have a lower net capital ratio than the aver-
age small bank operating exclusively in domestic markets. By this criterion some of the bigger
banks should pay higher premiums as well. Another problem with charging for FDIC insur-
ance according to risk is establishing a consensus on an FDIC risk premium schedule and
weighing factors relevant to these risks. Still another difficult question is whether the risk
premium charged should be disclosed and, if so, to whom. In any event, no strong support
exists for any fundamental change in the FDIC insurance system.
173. For authorities on loan workouts see supra note 4. See generally D. ROME, BUSINESS
WORKOUTS MANUAL (1985); Rome, The Business Workout-A Primer for Participating Cred-
itors, 11 U.C.C. L.J. 183 (1979).
174. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982). For the text of the civil remedies sections of RICO
see supra note 46. For a discussion of constitutionality of RICO see: American Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Haraco, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3291, 87 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1985); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 87 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1985). For a general discussion of Sedima see:
Abrams, The Civil RICO Controversy Reaches the Supreme Court, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 147
(1984); The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 120, 312-21 (1985). For a
critical analysis of RICO see Boucher, Why Civil RICO Must Be Reformed, J. ACCT., Dec.
1985, at 102 (author concludes that RICO "has been turned against the very people Congress
intended to protect"). For a discussion of lender liability cases under RICO see: Burke, RICO
Case Law Summary, in 3 EMERGING THEORIES, supra note 154, at 195; Kauffman & Levin,
Civil RICO Litigation Involving Banks: The Developing Case law, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1984);
Note, Prime-Rate Fraud Under RICO, 72 GEO. L.J. 1885 (1984).
175. For a concise survey of the consumer legislation affecting banks and other financial
institutions see J. NORTON & S. WHITLEY, supra note 3, § 2.04.
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sult, an increasingly popular view is that compensation of debtors is the cen-
tral purpose of the law.
This idea has particularly infected the courts. Understandably, courts find
compensation of debtors appealing. Appellate judges typically must choose
between a single plaintiff, often a major employer, who has suffered a loss
and a defendant who is a bank, often with substantial assets and seemingly
sufficient cash reserves. Judges as well as juries assume that such defendants
can readily absorb and widely distribute losses among their customers. The
very concept of lender liability is based upon the idea that liability can re-
lieve the suffering of individual debtors through the mechanism of the
price/interest system or through insurance. At the same time, debtors often
appear unable to absorb the losses very well. Yet the lenders, too, may have
difficulty in absorbing the costs of liability judgments or settlements. The
financial burden imposed upon banks under the emerging theories of liability
may be crushing. 176 The aggregate effects of these theories thus deserve spe-
cial attention.
2. Liability as Part of a Net of Control Devices.
As is evident from the discussion of Farah and the other cases, the evolv-
ing theories of lender liability, although they may be analyzed separately,
cannot be understood apart from the regulation of banks and other lending
institutions in general. These institutions operate in a legal, economic, and
social context in which public enforcement of duties imposed upon lenders
to strengthen the integrity of the banking system has considerable weight.
This context is a fairly complex and complicated blend of banking, financial,
securities, and antitrust laws. 177 The emerging theories of lender liability are
both part and product of this complex system of regulation. They are part of
that system because they are aiming at the regulation's objective that bank-
ing be safe and sound; 178 they are a product of that system because existing
regulatory, economic, and moral pressures appear to have failed to control
effectively all the conduct of lending institutions that society would like to
deter.
But are the developing theories of lender liability likely to promote more
desirable conduct on the part of lending institutions than that which would
occur in their absence? Can these theories be justified on the ground that
they promote socially and economically desirable conduct on the part of
lenders? Specifically, can they prevent damage by deterring unreasonable
interference in the business affairs of debtors? If the evolving theories of
lender liability effectively served deterrence purposes, that success would be
a persuasive, or at least powerful, argument for the retention or even expan-
176. For a discussion of the arguments advanced by the Missouri Bankers Association see
supra note 155.
177. For an analysis of the dual system of banking regulation see Scott, The Dual Banking
System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1977).
178. J. NORTON & S. WHITLEY, supra note 3, § 2.06.
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sion of these theories. Unfortunately, the deterrence function of expanded
liability theories seems insignificant.
To assume that, absent broad liability, bankers will selfishly pursue their
own interests, putting their banks' desires and interests ahead of the interests
of their debtors, is unreasonable. Bankers will be sensitive to the constraints
of law, but also to the imperatives of moral duty, social responsibility, and
the commercial value of an untarnished public image. While the implica-
tions of these nonlegal behavofial control mechanisms are not entirely clear,
it would, even without empirical inquiries into the causes and effects, seem
fair to assume that banks tend to do everything possible to avoid negative
publicity from court proceedings, investigations by regulatory authorities,
and media reporting. Most, if not all bankers, have a strong moral sensitiv-
ity; their pride in doing right and the accompanying embarrassment of doing
wrong do provide protection to a bank's customers and debtors. While not
all bankers have the proper moral inhibitions against behaving unreasonably
and acting in bad faith, "doing right" is internalized as an intrinsic part of a.
banker's calling. Bankers take considerable professional pride in the integ-
rity of their work. The objective of reasonableness and safe and sound bank-
ing is typically critical to bankers' own self-esteem and that of their banks.
The moral pressures are buttressed by market pressures. Traditional
banking practices have allocated credit according to the strength of collat-
eral, current and potential earnings, and risk of default, with interest rates
and fees reflecting differences in the risks and the respective bargaining pow-
ers of the borrower and the lender. Adequate competition among commer-
cial lending institutions helps ensure alternatives in bargaining for loans and
interest rates. To create an environment within which such competition can
develop, legislatures have enacted numerous statutes designed to limit exces-
sive concentration in the banking market. 179 The United States Supreme
Court has been very supportive of attempts to increase competition among
banks.I80 The antitrust laws, bank merger and bank holding company legis-
lation, and other regulations' 81 thus play an important role in preventing
179. See, e.g., J. HURST, supra note 170, at 203, 232; L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF ANTITRUST 603-05, 616-21 (1977); Berle, Banking Under the Anti-Trust Laws, 49
COLUM. L. REV. 589 (1949); Loevinger, Antitrust, Banking, and Competition, 30 ANTITRUST
BULL. 583 (1985).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350 (1970);
United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 717 (1968); United States v. First City Nat'l Bank,
386 U.S. 361 (1967); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). For
comments on these decisions see: W. ANDERSEN & C. ROGERS, ANTITRUST LAW: POLICY
AND PRACTICE 525-27, 609-13 (1985); May, Redefining the Product Market.- Commercial
Bank Mergers in the New Competitive Era, 103 BANKING L.J. 124 (1986).
181. See, for example, the premerger notification requirement of Clayton Act § 74, 15
U.S.C. § 18a (1982), added to the Clayton Act by the 1976 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Im-
provements Act. For a detailed discussion of the notification requirement and the Federal
Trade Commission's forms, see Halverson, Volk, Pogue & Pfunder, The Effects of Hart-Scott-
Rodino Premerger Notification Requirements on Mergers, Acquisitions and Tender Offers, 48
ANTITRUST L.J. 1451 (1979); see also Ebke, Uebersicht: Fusionskontrolle in den USA, in FU-
SIONSKONTROLLE IN USA 11-37 (Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag ed. 1978); Ebke,
Erweiterte Anzeigepflichten bei Unternehmenszusammenschluessen in den USA. Hart-Scott-
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unreasonable discrimination, undue interference, or exploitation with re-
spect to terms and conditions of credit.
In addition to external pressures resulting from keen competition among
banks and other commercial lending institutions, bank directors and officers
are subject to substantial control from within their corporations. Courts
have repeatedly held that bank directors and officers, because they are in
charge of other people's money, owe a special duty of care to their institution
and its constituency, the shareholders. Courts have long recognized that
directors of financial institutions owe high degrees of loyalty and allegiance
to their companies, loyalty that is undivided and allegiance that is not influ-
enced in action by any consideration other than the welfare of their institu-
tions. 182 In the discharge of their duties bank directors must, of course, act
honestly and in good faith, but honesty and good faith are not enough. Bank
directors must also exercise degrees of skill, diligence, and prudence that are
typically higher than that required of directors or officers of nonfinancial
institutions. 183 In light of this more stringent rule, bank directors and of-
ficers are inevitably exposed to hostile shareholder lawsuits, whether the ac-
tions are primary or derivative.' 8 4 Comparative studies show that
shareholder litigation plays an important role in policing the corporate sys-
tem and in controlling the conduct of corporate management. 8 5 Share-
holder actions against bank directors would surely have the same effect.
Moral sensitivities, internal control, competitive pressures, and the desire
for self-preservation are not of themselves sufficient to provide borrowers
and the general public with the necessary safeguards. The threat of potential
liability toward debtors is often thought of as a more efficient control device.
Will the emerging theories of lender liability be able to help close the gap
between how bankers ideally ought to act and how some of them in reality
do act? Good reason exists to think that the emerging liability theories will
not be fully effective in their operation. Good reason likewise exists to think
that the developing compensation system is not only enormously expensive,
but that it also sometimes ill serves the debtors' and the public's interest.
3. Inherent Limitations of Liability Theories.
Proponents of the emerging theories of lender liability will argue that the
prospect of liability for improper conduct in connection with workouts acts
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act von 1976 und FTC Premerger Notification Rules von 1978,
25 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 297 (1979).
182. See Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524, 530-31 (1920); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667
(Sup. Ct. 1940).
183. See, e.g., Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification
of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968); Grunewald & Golden,
Bank Director Liability Post-FIRA: How to Avoid It, 98 BANKING L.J. 412, 413-14 (1981);
Nicholas, FIRA: Emerging Patterns of Director Liability, 103 BANKING L.J. 151 (1986); see
also Campbell & Black, Emerging Doctrines of Fiduciary Responsibility of Credit Union Offi-
cials, 40 Bus. LAW. 957 (1985).
184. Bishop, Derivative Suits Against Bank Directors: New Problems, New Strategies, 97
BANKING L.J. 158 (1980).
185. Grossfeld & Ebke, Controlling the Modern Corporation: A Comparative View of Cor-
porate Power in the United States and Europe, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 397, 420-21 (1978).
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as an incentive for banks and other lending institutions to act more with a
view to the debtor's interests. Whatever value liability may have in influenc-
ing bankers' professional conduct, to suggest that liability does not have any
deterrent or preventive value would be incorrect. The deterrent or preven-
tive effects of the liability threat should not, however, be overestimated. The
model of deterrence requires knowledge of both facts and law. Yet many
bankers seem to be ignorant of the growing threat of liability, in part because
of individual inattentiveness and in part because of the fact that not all bank-
ers have the benefit of a legal education and are thus dependent upon their
lawyers to provide effective instruction concerning civil liabilities.
The growing number of lawsuits against lenders indicates that changes in
the law are not always transmitted to those involved in making fundamental
decisions. Even those bankers with broad awareness of their legal duties and
responsibilities have many reasons to see the law of lender liability as highly
unpredictable. Those reasons include not only doctrinal complexity, rapid
legal change, and state-to-state variance, but also the fact that, especially
under some of the presently evolving theories of lender liability, the line be-
tween prohibited and permissible activities is too often blurred. Thus, for
example, the theories of prima facie tort and good faith and fair dealing,
because of inherent uncertainties, are not specific enough to provide ade-
quate guidance, to serve as a deterrent to inappropriate banking and financ-
ing practices, or to prevent repetition of such practices.
Judicial interpretations thus far have not provided clear boundaries of ac-
ceptable conduct. The case-by-case approach is not efficient in terms of de-
terrence and prevention because the historical experience of a lender in
similar cases, or the experience of other lenders, may not be relevant or
available. Consequently, a lender may not be able to form a conclusion with
respect to a great number of practical questions arising in connection with
lending transactions and workouts. In such circumstances the lender's deci-
sion ordinarily will be one that, in its opinion, is not susceptible of reason-
able criticism. Yet, because of the uncertainties inherent in some of the
emerging theories of lender liability, whether the lender's personal assess-
ment and views in fact are consistent with the mandates of the law remains
unclear until a competent court resolves the issue in question. Hence, while
they may make lenders more cautious in general, the developing liability
theories would not seem to deter or prevent all conduct that society regards
as unacceptable.
The American legal, political, and economic systems, as well as the bank-
ing system, depend heavily upon voluntary compliance with the law and the
ability to interpret and implement the law. The expanding complexity of the
banking system and banking regulation and the growing competitive pres-
sures in the banking market increase the need for specific rules of conduct.
Without such rules society will accomplish little, if anything, in terms of
deterrence and prevention. Also, the nature of the damages in the cases
under discussion is such that in many workout situations, unlike in Farah,
bankers cannot become aware that their conduct is harmful until after the
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damage or the conduct giving rise to the cause of action has occurred. This
aspect, too, supports the proposition that the deterrent and preventive effects
of the rising liability doctrines should not be overestimated.
Additionally, the emerging lender liability theories lack direct deterrence.
The theory of vicarious liability, respondeat superior,18 6 causes debtors to
sue the institution rather than the directors, loan officers, or other employ-
ees. Banks, like other employers, typically do not exercise their right to seek
indemnity from the persons who actually act on their behalf.18 7 In some
cases, including Farah, indemnification may be precluded by indemnification
agreements between the banks and the directors concerned. 188 In many
other cases, the bank will carry liability insurance for its directors and of-
ficers. 189 As a result, the actual actors are not affected directly in monetary
terms by the developing theories of lender liability.
Certainly, a banker who has committed a wrong in the bank's name faces
the danger that he may lose his job. Nevertheless, the threat of a job loss
lacks substance given the inherent difficulty of isolating personal responsibil-
186. Restatement (Second) ofAgency provides that a person conducting an activity through
servants or other agents is subject to liability for harm resulting from his conduct if he is
negligent or reckless in the supervision of the activity. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 213(c) (1958). See generally H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 101-04 (1979). For a discussion of the historical origins of the
doctrine of respondeat superior see: Holmes, Agency, 4 HARV. L. REV. 345 (1891); Laski, The
Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105 (1916); Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious
Acts: Its History, 7 HARV. L. REV. 383, 404 (1894).
187. The question of whether an employer should seek indemnification from an employee
appears to be a matter of business judgment and thus should only be subject to limited judicial
scrutiny. Recent case law defines the business judgment rule as "a presumption that in making
a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company." Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). Thus, in a shareholder's action or in a derivative action
under FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1, a shareholder alleging that a board decision was uninformed must
rebut the presumption that the board exercised its business judgment in an informed manner.
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); see Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). But see Hasan v. Clevetrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372, 378 (6th
Cir. 1984) (finding no presumption of good faith). For a general discussion of the business
judgment rule see H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 35, at 661-63; Arsht, The Business
Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1979); Comment, Director Liability Under
the Business Judgment Rule: Fact or Fiction?, 35 Sw. L.J. 775 (1981).
188. The law of indemnification of corporate directors has undergone significant changes in
recent years. Compare MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 5 (1982) with id. §§ 8.50-.58 (1984).
For evaluations of the various statutory approaches see J. BISHOP, THE LAW OF CORPORATE
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS; INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE (1981); Knepper, Officers
and Directors: Indemnification and Liability Insurance-An Update, 30 Bus. LAW. 951
(1975); Symposium, Officers' and Directors' Responsibilities and Liabilities, Indemnification of
Officers and Directors and Insurance, 27 Bus. LAW. (Special Issue), Feb. 1972, at 109-64.
189. See Mitchell, Indemnification and Insurance for Bank Directors, 193 N.Y.L.J. 1
(1985). Most states have adopted statutes relating to liability insurance for directors and of-
ficers, usually referred to as "D & 0 insurance." R. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS INCLUDING
PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1017 (2d ed. 1981).
Even if no state statute expressly authorizes corporations to provide D & 0 insurance authori-
zation may be implied from other corporate powers relating to compensation of officers and
directors. Id. For a discussion of the practical need for and coverage of D & 0 insurance see:
Gawel, Jain & Agnello, Directors and Officers Indemnification Insurance: What Is Being Of-
fered?, J. AM. Soc. CLU, Nov. 1985, at 92, 92-101; Johnston, Corporate Indemnification and
Liability Insurance for Directors and Officers, 33 Bus. LAW. 1993, 2011-12 (1978).
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ity within the system of collective decision-making practiced by banks.
Moreover, peer pressure may lead to reservations against a punishment as
serious as termination. The effect of a personal stigma upon an employee
who acted on behalf of the bank should not, of course, be neglected. In a
society as litigious as the United States, however, the personal stigma consid-
eration does not support sufficiently the argument that harsh liability neces-
sarily leads to greater care on the part of an employee. The personal effects
that extend beyond a banker's professional career into his life and the stress
that can impair his productivity and his emotional and physical conditions
are, no doubt, serious concerns. These concerns, however, should not be
used as an argument in favor of attempts to broaden existing concepts of
lender liability.' 90
If both the existing and the emerging theories of lender liability add little,
if anything, in terms of deterrence and prevention, the principal purpose of,
and the moving force behind, those theories is the shifting of financial risks
from the debtor to the lender. Such allocation of risk, however, rarely
achieves the anticipated economic and social goals. As a general rule, when
a bank or a similar financial institution is liable to a debtor or when a bank
settles a doubtful case of potential liability to a debtor, the bank impairs its
capital. Such impairment arguably would be acceptable if it adversely af-
fected only the shareholders of the bank. Such impairment would seem to be
a normal and natural risk of an undertaking such as a bank. Most regretta-
bly, however, more than just the shareholders are affected.
Large liability judgments, such as the ones awarded in Farah,19 1
KM. C.,192 and Sanchez-Corea 193 add substantially to the costs of financial
institutions without adding anything to their revenues. Since the banks'
costs are then higher, the banks will demand a higher interest rate for loans
or higher fees for banking services. As interest rates and fees rise, prices of
the debtors' products or services will rise since the debtors will, at the next
possible occasion, pass the increased costs on to their customers. Increased
costs, then, represent a loss to the public at large, a social loss. The imposi-
tion of broad liabilities upon banks in connection with workout situations
thus turns out to be no more than a loss-spreading technique with high
transactional costs 194 related to the United States' custom of lawyers usually
being paid by the hour rather than according to statutory fee schedules. To-
put it differently, the emerging liability theories, if overemphasized, tend to
190. See Ebke, In Search of Alternatives, supra note 83, at 685.
191. State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, writ
dism'd by agr.) (over $18 million damage award).
192. K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) ($7.5 million damage
award).
193. Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of America, 38 Cal. 3d 892, 701 P.2d 826, 215 Cal. Rptr. 679
(1985) ($1 million damage award).
194. For a discussion of the inefficiency of a system of broad directors' liability see Conard,
A Behaviorial Analysis of Directors' Liability for Negligence, 1972 DUKE L.J. 895. Professor
Conard suggests a ceiling on damages awarded for directors' negligence because unlimited
liability would be uninsurable and unindemnifiable. Id.
1986]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
take away from bank customers some of the financial benefits that deregula-
tion schemes and modern consumer laws meant to give them.
The emerging theories of lender liability are not only financially burden-
some to debtors, depositors, and the public in general; they also result in
further concentration in the banking market. Use of the broad term "lend-
ers" tends to lead to the assumption that lenders are a fairly homogeneous
group of financial institutions with similar interests. That assumption does
not appear justified. Whereas large financial institutions may very well be
able to absorb or distribute items of increased cost such as liability judg-
ments or settlements, many small or medium-sized lending institutions find
themselves in a totally different position. Large liability judgments, made
possible by the developing liability theories, or settlements, encouraged by
the possible exposure to potentially enormous liability, could bankrupt
banks and thrift institutions that are not as strongly capitalized as their ma-
jor competitors. If only the financially secure institutions can absorb or dis-
tribute liability costs, large damage awards based upon liberally applied
substantive liability rules, coupled in some cases with awards of punitive
damages, will, in the end, lead to more concentration in the banking market
and to a curtailment of the benefits of competition. Although concentration
may ultimately enhance the soundness and stability of the financial sys-
tem, 195 the removal of less strongly capitalized financial institutions may not
prove beneficial for depositors and debtors since less competition will almost
,inevitably result in less favorable terms on loan and deposit transactions.
Viewed from this angle, inherently formless liability theories such as control,
bad faith, and prima facie tort will, in the final analysis, disadvantage, not
protect, depositors, debtors, and the consuming public by reducing competi-
tion and raising interest rates and banking service fees. 19 6
Far-reaching civil liabilities based upon inherently uncertain legal theories
may also cause socially and economically undesirable defensive banking
practices, including increased use of personal guarantees, demands for sub-
stantial collateral, and preparation of documents with a view toward creat-
ing defenses. The gravest danger of the new liability theories is that they will
create an overly cautious banking system. In that event the likelihood is that
companies and individuals will soon be heard to complain of banks refusing
to grant loans, not because the banks think the loans unreasonably risky, but
because the banks choose to minimize the risk of getting caught up in what
they perceive to be an expensive liability theory lottery. Defensive banking
practices thus may hinder the entrepreneurial revolution that the United
States has witnessed in recent years. We need legal rules with proper eco-
nomic incentives for banks, not rules that take away incentives.
Even this discouraging news has a bright side, however. The emerging
theories of lender liability, no doubt, will create a higher demand for the
195. T. CARGILL & G. GARCIA, FINANCIAL DEREGULATION AND MONETARY CONTROL
59 (1982).
196. Similar concerns arise in the area of professional malpractice liability. See Ebke, In
Search of Alternatives, supra note 83, at 690-91.
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estimated 675,000 lawyers in the United States. 197 The increasing number of
lawyers will find a growing market for legal and consulting services. Special
programs sponsored by various professional organizations will help bankers
and their corporate and litigation counsels acquire the substantive knowl-
edge and the procedural skills that they need to master the growing number
of cases in this area.198 The future of the developing liability theories de-
pends, in the final analysis, upon the extent to which corporate counsels and
litigators are skilled in utilizing the theories and upon their willingness to
test them in court. Nevertheless, the special interests that certain members
of the legal profession may have as private attorneys general in the emerging
field of lender liability law do not, without more, seem to outweigh the dis-
advantages of the developing liability system to lenders, borrowers, and the
general public.
4. The Need for a Conceptual Reorientation.
Because of the disadvantages of the developing liability system, banks and
other lending institutions, their customers and debtors, as well as judges and
lawyers, need to reorient their thinking, reevaluate their conduct, and recon-
ceptualize their objectives and strategies. New modes of thinking and new
orientations are needed if the regulation of the banking industry is to achieve
its primary goals: to assure financial security of lending institutions and
hence of the deposits they hold, and to provide the economy with capital at
affordable interest rates. In modem service and information societies such
as the United States the driving force and key to economic achievement,
development, and progress is capital; capital represents access to resources,
including technology and information. The uninterrupted flow of affordably
priced capital thus is vital for trade, productivity, economic growth, societal
prosperity, and individual well-being. With this in mind, the parameters of a
lender's responsibility ought to be determined. The end of the safe harbor
theories will free the energies of judges, lawyers, and academicians to enter-
tain the problems and opportunities of the existing and emerging theories of
liability of banks and other commercial lending institutions.
The need for a solution places a special responsibility upon judges. The
existing body of lender liability law in the United States should be under-
stood as a series of emergency and otherwise corrective and protective meas-
ures designed to be helpful, rather than as a single master plan or ideological
program. The liability theories that are extant today or currently evolving
are not the product of a carefully thought-through plan. The dominant
theme is pragmatism and the idea that the courts should act to compensate
debtors and to restore and maintain confidence in financial matters and the
banking system as a whole. In adhering to that theme, courts are attempting
197. Samuelson, The Lawyering of America, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 10, 1986, at 66.
198. The course materials of a recent program of the American Bar Association are con-
tained in 1-3 EMERGING THEORIES, supra note 154. The Practising Law Institute has also
conducted a program on the developing theories of lender liability. These materials are repro-
duced in Burke, Thomas & Warren, supra note 123, at 403.
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to implement the policy of safe and sound banking within the lender-debtor
relationship. The relative flexibility of the common law doctrines in ques-
tion and the plaintiff-oriented rules of procedure in the United States' 99 give
American courts real leverage to shape, at least to some degree, the develop-
ment of lenders' liability. As stated earlier, the body of principles that have
developed in this ad hoc fashion by now is a substantial and impressive one.
Without doubt, courts should wield their power in order to help fulfill the
objective of fair banking in commercial lending transactions. How far the
courts should go is, as in other areas of the law, a matter of degree.
Cases as extreme as Farah are particularly apt to be cited in support of the
proposition that private enforcement of lenders' duties by means of civil lia-
bility actions ensures fair dealing and prevents unreasonable interference or
exploitation by lenders with respect to terms and conditions of credit. Farah
directed our attention to a number of questionable banking practices of well-
established financial institutions in their dealings with a financially and
otherwise troubled debtor. Yet, hard cases do not necessarily make good
law.20 0 The choice is not one between the present compensation system and
its simple repeal. We are not advocating that the lender liability theories be
abandoned, but rather that the emerging theories of lender liability be ap-
plied cautiously and that the compensation model take account of many
other important regulatory factors. True, no neat dividing line exists be-
tween too much and too little liability, but we can impose self-restraints on
the liability system by revitalizing control devices other than liability ac-
tions. The Farah case is a particular illustration of the need for a balanced
approach to the solution of the overall problem. The level of change of
development reflected in the Farah decision is so fundamental, yet at the
same time so subtle, that the change might be viewed as inevitable in light of
the extreme facts of the case. To view the change as inevitable, however,
would ignore the potential impact of this decision on lenders in the United
States. It would also ignore the regulatory and economic contexts that ap-
pear to give rise to a higher demand for workouts.
These regulatory and economic contexts are in a state of transition. The
banking industry is clearly experiencing numerous uncertainties. In this sit-
uation courts should not create additional uncertainty in the law governing
commercial lending transactions by creating vague and open-ended causes of
action and applying existing causes of action in ways in which they were
never before applied. The emerging compensation system could, of course,
merely be a reaction to the changing environment of financial institutions;
the new approach could dissolve as soon as the banking system as a whole is
in balance again and the overall economic situation improves. Yet, while the
creation of unprecedented compensation theories may be difficult, retreat
from the broad parameters of liability exposure engendered by the courts
199. See Ebke, In Search of Alternatives, supra note 83, at 687-88.
200. For the famous remarks of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes see Northern Sec. Co. v.




will be even more difficult since every compensation system creates expecta-
tions on the part of those who are potential beneficiaries of that system. We
are about to permit the compensation system to become excessively individu-
alistic by extending the benefits of compensation to larger and larger num-
bers of borrowers. Such individualistic expectations, once created, cannot be
eliminated without hardship. Accordingly, it is vitally necessary to balance
the economic and regulatory environment within which the lender-debtor
relationship operates before further expanding lender liability theories. The
new lending limits for national banks201 and the proposed regulation by the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board that would require thrift institutions to
raise capital levels over the next several years20 2 are promising beginnings.
Only if those who are responsible for balancing the regulatory and economic
environment fail, should courts utilize their judicial powers to provide debt-
ors and others with the necessary safeguards.
Banks and other commercial lending institutions, too, need to reorient
their thinking and conduct. 20 3 Organizational precautions, improved infor-
mation flows between bank officers and directors, better training of employ-
ees, full and fair disclosure of the bank's major decisions concerning the
debtor, careful drafting of documents, updating of forms, more legal educa-
tion, and an efficient internal control system may help restore and maintain
the balance between debtors and lenders in commercial lending transactions.
Additionally, bankers should not worry so much about short-term earnings,
up-coming financial statements, and bonuses based upon short-term per-
formance, but rather should concern themselves with the firm's long-term
activities. Bankers have to become more sensitive to the long-range implica-
tions of their short-term actions and decisions. The prudent investor-share-
holder should appreciate and support a proposed change in management
perception.
Borrowers, too, should become aware that they can and ought to do some-
thing to improve their position vis-A-vis their lenders. In working out their
financial or other problems with their bankers, borrowers should bring their
own legal counsel in order to put themselves on a par with the financial
institutions and their legal counsel. Borrowers should not accept manage-
ment change clauses and other similarly restrictive covenants in any loan
agreements if they have reason to believe that they will be unable to cope
with the influence that such clauses may permit the lenders to exercise
within the lender-debtor relationship. 204 Furthermore, borrowers and their
201. For a thorough discussion of the new lending limits see: Norton, Lending Limits and
National Banks Under the 1982 Banking Act, 101 BANKING L.J. 122 (1984); Rojc, National
Bank Lending Limits-A New Framework, 40 Bus. LAW. 903 (1985). Lending limits have
undergone various transformations since their inception in 1863. For a discussion of the statu-
tory history of lending limits laws see Glidden, National Bank Lending Limits and the Comp-
troller's Regs: A Clarification, 101 BANKING L.J. 430, 432-37 (1984).
202. See Thrifts to Face Rule Boosting Capital Levels, Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 1986, at 3, col. 4.
203. See Norton, Theories of Lender Liability: Practical Lessons for Lenders and Counsel,
23 ST. B. TEX., BULL. SEC. ON CORP., BANKING & Bus. LAW, Feb. 1986, at 2, 22-24.
204. Judge Higginbotham, in a separate action involving the management change clause in
Farah, see supra note 24, stated: "[t]he relationship between the lenders' business interest and
1986]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
attorneys need to accept the fact that lenders' pockets may not always be
deep enough to permit recovery if the borrowers themselves cannot resolve
the problems that originally necessitated the adoption of management
change clauses. Finally and importantly, borrowers need to realize that the
theory of lender liability to debtors needs to be implemented with restraint
as it involves the judicial determination of public policy; the emerging theo-
ries of lender liability are not meant to be a judicial device that enables a
court to impose randomly its sense of justice and fairness on a market place
dependent upon supply and demand in arriving at contractual terms.
IV. CONCLUSION
The great lesson, we think, that can be drawn from the growing body of
case law of lender liability is a modern version of the ancient Greek ideal
[qq~iv &yav (balance), balance between a lender's interest in assuring re-
payment and the debtor's interest in freedom from undue interference by the
creditor. Where to draw the line, of course, cannot be stated in terms of an
abstract rule or principle. Courts need a certain flexibility in deciding the
kinds of cases discussed in this Article since such decisions are dependent
upon many factors. Courts should, however, closely coordinate existing and
emerging liability theories so as to create a body of coherent principles and
rules that give commercial lenders fair notice that certain activities are unac-
ceptable and may result in liability and that provide courts, attorneys, and
all concerned adequate guidance as to whether and how a lender's conduct
resulting in economic harm to a debtor can be remedied. In their endeavor
to shape the lender liability law of the future, courts should remember that
an overexpansion of liability theories, irrespective of how noble the judici-
ary's motives may be, is more likely to upset the present balance between the
adverse interests of lenders and debtors than attempts to proceed cautiously
toward a rational body of principles and rules. Courts should also remember
that radical changes in the law of lender liability are better wrought by the
legislatures.
In any event, borrowers, depositors, lenders, and society will be decidedly
better off if courts and legislatures keep lenders' liability within reasonable
their actions is both obvious and reasonable." Farah v. Republic Nat'l Bank, No. CA-3-79-
0187-G (N.D. Tex. April 8, 1981) (opinion on motion to dismiss), reprinted in part in Applica-
tion for Writ of Error at 50, State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App.-
El Paso 1984, writ dism'd by agr.) (copy on file at offices of Southwestern Law Journal). Judge
Higginbotham elaborated:
The lenders expressly conditioned the loan on a provision that, in effect, gave
them substantial influence over the composition of FMC's executive manage-
ment. FMC did not have to agree to such a relationship, but it chose to do so.
It simply stretches credulity to believe, as Farah has implied, that FMC did not
understand that the default provision gave the lenders great influence in deter-
mining who controlled the affairs of FMC. The lenders bargained for and ob-
tained a contractual provision that enabled them to protect their interest from
adverse changes in FMC's management. It necessarily was understood that the
lenders would use their right to declare an event of default as leverage in ob-
taining a management most agreeable to their interest in protecting the loan.
Id., reprinted in part in Application for Writ of Error at 5-6.
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limits. Too much reliance upon private enforcement of a lenders' duties
leads to imbalance, neglects important and potentially efficient regulatory
and other control devices, and results in adverse financial and economic con-
sequences. The legislatures should do whatever may be necessary to provide
a legal, economic, social, and political environment within which banks can
operate in their own best interest and that of their debtors, depositors, and
the public at large.

